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Abstract
Economic integration is a double-edged sword. It provides opportunities of advancement for in-
dividuals in countries embracing the global economy and leads to the diffusion of ideas of good
governance. Yet, some forms of integration are associated with the deterioration of local standards
and practices. In this paper, we analyze how a speciﬁc form of economic integration, foreign di-
rect investment (FDI), relates to a speciﬁc governance outcome in host countries: the prevalence
of corruption. We argue that the relationship between inward FDI and corruption depends on the
underlying conditions in the host country. We test the hypotheses of the non-linear relationship
of FDI and corruption in an instrumental variable two-stage least squares setting. The results in-
dicate that FDI is associated with higher levels of corruption in less developed countries but not
in developed countries. We also ﬁnd that FDI is associated with higher levels of corruption in
autocracies.
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1 Introduction
The causes and consequences of globalization are central themes in comparative and international po-
litical economy scholarship. Scholars and pundits have churned numerous articles and books on how
economic integration through trade and ﬁnance affects both politics and policy-making throughout
the world. Studies on the causes and consequences of globalization has concentrated on cross-border
trade of goods and services. In the past few decades, recent changes in the organization of economic
activity have brought international investment to the attention of politicians, pundits and scholars.1
Moreover, there is a profuse literature on the political determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI)
and multinational corporation (MNC) activity.2 Moreover, anecdotal evidence and journalistic ac-
counts notwithstanding, few studies analyze the effect of FDI on corruption in host countries (Sand-
holtz and Gray 2003).3
In this paper we analyze the link between foreign investment inﬂows and governance. In partic-
ular, we study how FDI affects corruption, which is traditionally deﬁned as the “use of public ofﬁce
for private beneﬁt.” (Bardhan 1997: 1321; see also Treisman 2007). We focus on the effect of FDI on
grand corruption, the form of corruption involving the highest ranked public ofﬁcials and leaders. Ac-
cording to received wisdom we should expect a negative correlation between foreign investment and
corruption, since corruption has the potential to depress investment and discourage foreign investors.4
1The dramatic surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows since the 1960s has brought multinational corporations
as highly inﬂuential actors in the globalized economy. “MNEs now account for about 70 percent of world trade, and the
sales of their foreign afﬁliates have exceeded total global exports.” (Li and Resnick 2003, 175; see Held et al. 1999). FDI
ﬂows have tapered off in 2001-2003 as a consequence of global economic and political instability, and have dropped off
dramatically during the Global Recession of 2008. Yet the extent of production and economic exchanges conducted under
multinational corporations and global production networks remains at unprecedented levels.
2On the links between politics and FDI, see Jensen (2003), Jensen et al. (2012), Li and Resnick (2003), Pinto (2013),
Pinto and Pinto (2008), and Wei (2000). On the consequences of FDI, see Reuveny and Li (2003), Scheve and Slaughter
(2004), Rudra (2005), Pinto and Pinto (2008), and Jensen et al (2012) among others.
3The argument that FDI can lead to negative political conditions, including corruption, in host countries is far from
novel; it exists in the Dependentista and Triple Alliance tradition, once in vogue during the late 1970s. See Moran
(1978) for a review of said literature and derivation of testable hypotheses. The specialized press discusses the potentially
negative consequences of foreign investment, particularly the type that is motivated by the need to secure access to food,
oil, andnaturalresources. SeeTheEconomist, 17October2008, “Growingmorecorrupt. AlthoughAfrica’seconomiesare
growing, they appear to be getting more corrupt too. The China factor”; and The Economist, 23 May 2009, “Outsourcing’s
third wave. Buying farmland abroad. The scramble for land in Africa and Asia.”
4“Poor quality of institutions necessary for well-functioning markets (and/or corruption) increases the cost of doing
1The explanation is simple: When faced with high demands for bribes and payments in a host country,
investors who have the ability to move internationally would choose to exit or stay out.5 Indeed, Wei
(2000a) reports a negative correlation between perceived corruption levels and inward foreign direct
investment, providing preliminary support to this claim.6 Competition for foreign capital would en-
courage governments to reform their regulatory environments, which leads to a “race to the top” in
governance standards (Malesky 2008; Sandholtz and Gray 2003). At the core of these explanations
is the assumption that foreign investment leads to greater competition in the marketplace, resulting in
a more efﬁcient allocation of resources, and that FDI promotes the diffusion of pro-business norms
and ideas which lead to the adoption of better governance practices, protection of property rights and
the consolidation of the rule of law (UNCTAD 1999). The conclusion that inward FDI should be
associated with lower corruption levels naturally follows (Gerring and Thacker, 2005).
Yet foreign investors are not always deterred by corruption; many investors appear to be very apt
to adjust to local practices, and there is anecdotal evidence of foreign investors engaging actively in
corrupt practices (Søreide 2006).7 This observation should come to no surprise to students for foreign
investment given that FDI is a peculiar economic entity: it is a form of investment where production is
organized hierarchically under the control of the parent company in order to protect intangible assets.8
Given its special nature, FDI could have negative effects on economic and political consequences in
the host country (see Evans 1979; Kobrin 1987; Moran 1978, 1998), a factor that has been overlooked
in the prevailing explanations on the consequences of globalization.
A vast body of literature in economics analyzes the special nature of FDI and MNCs, documenting
business and, thus, should also diminish FDI activity.” (Bloningen 2005: 14). See also Alesina and Weder (1999), Hines
(1996), Smarzynska and Wei (2000), and Wei (1997, 2000a, 2000b).
5On the negative effect of corruption on economic activity, Bardhan (1997), Egger and Winner (2005), Lambsdorff
(2003), Mauro (1995), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and World Bank (1997), among others, ana-
lyze the effect of corruption on FDI.
6Sandholtz and Gray (2003) ﬁnd that increasing international integration—including FDI—is negatively correlated
with corruption at the national level. Corruption under these conditions is characterized as a “grabbing hand” that reduces
the incentives to invest. See also Egger and Winner (2005: 933).
7Egger and Winner (2005: 933) discuss the conditions under which corruption could help promote foreign investment:
“... in the presence of regulations and other administrative controls, corruption can act as a ‘helping hand’ to foster FDI,
as proposed by Leff (1964).” Field Jr., Sosa, and Wu (2003) have formally proven the logic behind this proposition
8Economic explanations of FDI and MNCs grounded in the transaction costs tradition suggest that political conditions
in host countries, including corruption, affect the form of entry and the decision to invest under direct control (Caves 1996;
Henisz 2000; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). Even other accounts suggest that corruption “greases” the wheel of commerce
allowing investors to engage in highly proﬁtable endeavors (Kaufmann & Wei 2000).
2how their effects co-vary with underlying conditions in the host country. According to this literature,
the potential beneﬁts associated with FDI, including technology, know-how spillovers, and crowding-
in of domestic investment, are likely to depend on local absorptive capacities. And the presence of
those absorptive capacities usually depend on the level of economic development and with market
structures in the countries where foreign investors operate (see Kokko and Bl¨ omstrom 1995; Caves
1996; Borensztein et al. 1998; Bl¨ omstrom and Kokko 1999, 2003; Agosin and Mayer 2000; Kobrin
2005). Investors who operate in less competitive environments have the potential to crowd out do-
mestic investment, and even stiﬂe market competition, resulting in higher proﬁt margins or rents that
investors themselves could appropriate.9 The effect of inward investment on rent creation in markets
populated by more productive ﬁrms are likely to be mitigated since competitive pressure is likely to
dominate the crowding out effect.
For researchers interested in empirically estimating the relationship between foreign investment
and corruption the issue is thus identifying which of the two effects dominates: Does inward invest-
ment result in higher competition, the erosion of rents and hence lower corruption levels? Or does
inward investment crowd out domestic investment, restricting market competition and increasing the
opportunities for rent creation that are associated with higher corruption levels? We argue that the
effect depends on the economic environment in which the investor operates. This prediction runs
counter to received wisdom where the effects of FDI on corruption are construed as either always
positive (leading to better conditions in host countries) or always negative (leading to negative condi-
tions in host countries).
The logic is simple: corruption is positively associated with opportunities to create and extract
rents as persuasively shown in the literature (Ades and Di Tella 1999). The economic environment—
which we characterize by its degree of market diversiﬁcation and competition—affects those oppor-
tunities for rent creation and hence determines the beneﬁts that government ofﬁcials and investors
expect when demanding and paying bribes respectively. FDI inﬂows will be associated with higher
levels of corruption in countries with less diversiﬁed economies where foreign investment is more
9Furthermore, MNCs usually have access to technology and know-how that allow them to exploit local resources
more effectively than domestic ﬁrms in developing and emerging markets, and are likely to drive domestic ﬁrms out of
the market (see Bl¨ omstrom and Kokko 1999, 2003; Caves 1996; Kobrin 2005; Kokko and Bl¨ omstrom 1995).
3likely to crowd out domestic investment, which affects respectively the opportunities for rent creation
and the ability of investors to appropriate those rents and share them with the incumbent. The effect
will be mitigated in economic environments where the entry of foreign investors is more likely to
compete economic rents away.
Analyzing the relationship between FDI and corruption is fraught with technical problems, includ-
ing that of endogeneity. Yet, most empirical attempts to date fail to adequately address this problem.
Dealing with endogeneity is at the center of our empirical strategy. We construct an instrumental vari-
able for FDI, which we then use to test our hypothesis that the effect of FDI on corruption depends on
economic conditions in host countries. To capture the non-linear relationship between FDI and cor-
ruption, we also include interaction terms of the instrumented FDI inﬂows with real GDP per capita,
our proxy for economic development and diversiﬁcation. Economic development is usually associ-
ated with more competitive and diversiﬁed markets. Thus we analyze the effect of FDI on corruption
for countries at different levels of development. We ﬁnd strong and robust evidence that FDI is indeed
associated with higher observed corruption levels in less developed countries; the effect disappears as
countries reach a minimum threshold of development.10
We also explore an alternative mechanism through which the effect of FDI on corruption could be
mitigated. Economic development could be capturing an alternative feature of the host country: its
degree of political institutionalization. Political development also has the potential to affect corruption
directly and the effects of inward FDI. Political institutions determine the level at which rents and
bribes are collected, as well as the ease with which those bribes remain undetected.11 The costs
of engaging in corruption are, arguably, higher for foreign investors who either have less access to
politicians.12 Foreign investors are usually less willing to spend resources in local politics since they
have the option of voting with their feet. Foreign investors who can move internationally are able to
10The results are robust to alternative proxies of market diversiﬁcation, such as export concentration.
11One of the features of political development is competition for public ofﬁce. Political has the potential to act as a
check on corruption. In more competitive political environments challengers could use public distaste for dishonest be-
havior and abuse of power to undermine the support of the incumbent, increasing the costs of pocketing revenue and rents
and engaging in corruption. “Countries with more political competition have stronger public pressure against corruption
-through laws, democratic elections, and even the independent press- and so are more likely to use government organi-
zations that contain rather than maximize corruption proceeds (Shleifer and Vishny 1993: 610; see also Lederman et al.
2005).”
12Moreover, foreign interests have been frequently targets of campaigns aimed at exacerbating nationalistic sentiment.
4compare the net expected returns in the host country with expected returns abroad. Paying bribes, just
like paying taxes, is costly and could affect the decision to enter.13
At any given level of rent creation, as the probability of getting caught goes up, the net expected
returns will go down, reducing the incentives to enter; this is consistent with traditional risk-reward
explanations of FDI activity. If host governments want to lure investors, they should either offer
them a share of the rents to be created by reducing competition in the marketplace (at an economic
cost to other economic actors, including producers and consumers in the host country, which could
jeopardize the probability of staying in ofﬁce) or rein in corruption, in line with recent work by
Malesky (2008), among others. Hence, FDI will result in higher corruption levels where political
competition is restricted, further reducing the costs of engaging in the quid-pro-quo exchange that
characterizes corrupt behavior. The effect of FDI on corruption should be highest when political
and economic development are at their lowest levels, a conjecture that seems to be borne out by
the data when interacting. We could expect the marginal effect of FDI inﬂows on corruption to be
lower in highly competitive economic and political environments since opportunities for engaging
in corruption are already low, more economic actors are affected by corrupt behavior, and access to
politicians and political accountability are likely to increase the expected costs of being caught.
Lastly, we explore whether integration with the global economy, including investment and trade,
is the force driving corruption and whether this effect is conditional on the level of political and eco-
nomic development in the host country. The results are weaker suggesting that economic integration
affects corruption primarily through investment rather than trade.
Our ﬁndings underscore the importance of accounting for the strategic interaction between host
governments and investors in the study of the causes and consequences of foreign investment. Com-
petition for FDI could be associated with the diffusion of better government. Yet foreign investors
have shown to be able to adapt to risky investment environment.14 Under these conditions we could
expect foreign investment to lead to higher corruption.
13There is a large body of literature on this point, including Lederman et al. (2005), Smarzynska and Wei (2002), and
Wei (1997, 2000a, 2000b).
14This is in line with the ﬁndings on the effect of foreign investment in transition economies (Hellman et al. 2002).
52 Foreign Investment, Rents and Corruption
In order to estimate how FDI affects corruption we need to establish how the presence and activity of
MNCs affect the conditions that make corruption more prevalent, for which we can draw from the ex-
isting body of literature international economics, business and politics.15 In that literature corruption
is deﬁned as the “use of public ofﬁce for private gains, where an ofﬁcial (the agent) entrusted to carry-
ing out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment
which is difﬁcult to monitor for the principal” (Bardhan 1997: 1321). The incentives to engage in this
exchange of public favor for private gain are based upon the conditions affecting the expected beneﬁts
and costs to those involved in the exchange. On the ﬁrst account, the literature on the determinants
of corruption has persuasively shown that political and economic conditions create the incentives that
“shape opportunities for corrupt behavior” (Montinola and Jackman 2002: 149).16 The incentives to
engage in corruption increase with the availability of rents associated with the exploitation of natural
resources or with restricted competition in product markets.17 In countries with large endowments of
valuable raw materials—fuels, minerals and metals—corruption may offer greater potential gain to
ofﬁcials who allocate rights to exploit such resources (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Leite and Weidmann
1999). Rent creation may also result from a greater scope of government activity and a larger partici-
pation of the public sector in the economy.18 The payoffs to corrupt behavior are larger under market
conditions conducive to the creation of rents that can be shared between public and private agents
participating in this exchange.19
While the relationship between economic (and political) development and corruption has received
15See Treisman (2007) for a survey of this literature.
16Economic development, for instance, has been found to be negatively associated with different measures of corruption
(Ades and Di Tella 1999; La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000, 2007).
17Ades and Di Tella (1999, 982) characterize these opportunities as the the industrial organization of the bribers’
market.
18See Ades and Di Tella (1999), Beck (1994), Lambsdorff (2007: 4). Gerring and Thacker (2005: 243-49), on the other
hand, ﬁnd no association between size of the public sector and corruption.
19The beneﬁts of engaging in corruption can be mitigated by the costs that associated with the probability of getting
caught, which is partly affected by the system of incentives and constraints created by political institutions, which we
explore later in the paper. Political institutions, including those that affect the degree to which there is greater political
competition, checks and balances, the existence of an independent judiciary and the rule of law, affect the degree of
accountability of leaders, and hence the opportunity to pocket taxes, royalties, fees and proceeds collected from economic
agents. Abuse of public ofﬁce for private beneﬁt is more likely in political systems where leaders and public ofﬁcials are
less accountable to the public, or less likely to be caught and/or punished when participating in illegal activities. Therefore,
corruption will be more pervasive in economic and political environments where competition is low..
6plenty of scholarly attention, research on the effects of economic integration lags behind. The liter-
ature has pointed to the link between international trade and corruption: imports are likely to create
competition in the market place, reducing the opportunities to extract rents, and thus the expected
beneﬁts of corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999). On the other hand, regulating and restricting trade
through the distribution of import licenses and quotas has the potential to lead to bribery, graft and
corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2005; Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Sandholtz and Koetzke 2000; Tanzi
1994; Treisman 2000). Moreover, exports of fuels, metals and minerals have been found to be pos-
itively correlated with the level of corruption, which might result from the opportunities of rent cre-
ation associated with the ownership and exploitation of natural resources (Ades and Di Tella 1999;
Treisman 2000).
FDI, our main explanatory variable, involves the ﬂow of investment capital across national borders
where the investor, usually an MNC, retains a controlling stake over an afﬁliate established in a differ-
ent country. Conceptually FDI and MNCs are two sides of the same coin. The choice of establishing
an afﬁliate abroad derives from the existence of proprietary intangible assets such as brand names,
managerial skills, and production technology, which makes arms’ length relations risky. Transaction
costs associated with protecting those valuable intangible assets justify the extra burden of setting up a
hierarchical structure of control over an afﬁliate operating abroad (Caves 1996; Dunning 1977, 1993).
Given the peculiar nature of MNCs, their presence has the potential to stiﬂe or promote competition
depending on the market structure and absorptive capacity of the host country. This is fairly uncontro-
versial and consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between limited
competition and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Lambsdorff 2003; Mauro 1995; Shleifer and
Vishny 1993; Treisman 2000, 2007).
Given its special nature FDI has the potential to affect market competition in host countries, a key
determinant of the beneﬁts and opportunities for engaging in corruption. Differences in productivity
between foreign investors and incumbent ﬁrms has the potential to affect market structure, and hence
the level of economic rents created. When the difference in productivity between the entrant and the
incumbent ﬁrms is low, the competitive effect of entry dominates resulting in rent dissipation. When
the difference in productivity between the foreign investor and the incumbent ﬁrms is high, entry of
7the foreign ﬁrm has the potential to crowd out domestic ﬁrms. This crowding out effect is likely to
dominate the competitive pressure, leading to more concentrated markets and higher rent creation.
We explore this relationship in the next section.
2.1 Market Structure, FDI and Corruption
Previous research on the relationship between FDI and corruption is explicitly or implicitly based
on the assumption that all direct investment reacts in a similar fashion to domestic conditions, and
has identical effects in all economic environments. Since corruption acts as a tax, investors will
avoid countries with higher incidence of corruption, graft, and abuse of public ofﬁce (Alesina and
Weder 1999; Smarzynska and Wei 2000; Wei 1997). When entering a country foreign investors
would increase the pressure on host governments to engage in good governance. This is a sensible
explanation: engaging the global economy could lead to diffusion of best practices, including lower
corruption. Yet we believe that this generalization is incorrect. It has been shown, for instance, that
the positive spillover of FDI activity in host countries depends on the prevailing conditions in those
countries: positive productivity spillovers, for instance, are more likely in host countries with a more
educated workforce, more developed ﬁnancial markets, and lower barriers to entry (Borensztein et
al. 1998; Bl¨ omstrom and Kokko 1999, 2003; Agosin and Mayer 2000). Following this literature
we argue that the effect of inward FDI on corruption depends on the competitive pressure created by
the entry of foreign ﬁrms. As argued above, when entering markets where they face less productive
competitors, foreign investors have the potential to crowd out domestic ﬁrms. This crowding out
effect reduces competition resulting in higher proﬁt margins or rents that investors themselves could
appropriate.20
Less developed economies tend to exhibit lower degrees of diversiﬁcation, lag behind in innova-
tion and technology, and have less competitive markets for goods, services and factors of production.
They are usually characterized by limited indigenous capacity and low competition due to market or
regulatory conditions. When entering less developed markets foreign investors have the potential to
crowd out domestic ﬁrms, further stiﬂing competition and creating more opportunities for rent extrac-
20Moreover, independent on the effect on the number of ﬁrms in the market, the higher productivity of the entrant would
result in a higher wedge between the average and marginal costs, leading to higher economic rents.
8tion. When foreign ﬁrms –with more advanced technology and lower marginal costs of production–
enter a market, they cause a reduction in the market shares of domestic ﬁrms, pushing some of them
out of the market. A shrinking market share increases the average production costs of domestic ﬁrms
and leads to a decline in their proﬁtability.21 Under these conditions foreign investors, who have a
productivity advantage over their local counterparts; the crowding out effect of entry of the foreign
ﬁrm is likely to dominate.22 Foreign entry would result in higher rents, which increase the opportuni-
ties for corruption. These rents could ultimately be shared between investors, who help create them,
and government ofﬁcials, who are in position to regulate investors’ presence and activity, grant or
deny the licenses and permits, and uphold the restrictive market conditions.23
Sharing the rents created by their activity with local leaders is costly to foreign investor who
would rather pocket those rents themselves. Yet, the expected returns of engaging in corruption could
be worth these costs where the opportunities for rent extraction are great, especially for those investors
who remain undeterred by the underlying conditions in the host country. Thus, we predict that higher
FDI inﬂows will result in higher levels of corruption in less diversiﬁed economies, particularly those
where markets are less competitive.
In developed economies where MNCs are likely to coexist with incumbent ﬁrms with similar
capacities, technologies and know-how, the entry of foreign investors is likely to increase competition,
resulting in a dissipation of economic rents. FDI has the potential to intensify competitive pressures,
ultimately forcing all ﬁrms to cut prices, further reducing the opportunities for rent creation and
appropriation.24 To the extent that development proxies for diversiﬁed markets and the existence of
domestic business capacity, then we could expect foreign investment to be associated with higher
levels of corruption in less developed countries.
21This is what Aitken and Harrison (1999) deﬁne as the market-stealing effect or negative technology spillover of
MNCs.
22The capital, technology and know-how provided by foreign investors help relax the constraints faced by host govern-
ments in exploiting the local resources that would otherwise remain idle or under-exploited in the absence of the foreign
investor.
23Chinese investment in resource rich countries in Africa, for instance exempliﬁes this trend.
24To the extent that the economy remains open to foreign investment, local market participants who want to stay
competitive have an incentive to demand institutions to restrict the ability of elected ofﬁcials to engage in graft and
demand bribes.
92.1.1 Testable hypothesis
Based on the above analysis on the economic and political conditions affecting the opportunities and
costs of corruption in host governments, we could derive the following testable hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Higher (lower) FDI will increase (lower) corruption in less developed economies.
Note that this hypothesis assumes that FDI and corruption are jointly determined. If domestic
ﬁrms, in anticipation to the additional competition that could result from potential entry of a foreign
investor, are able to obtain protection through lobbying, we would observe less FDI.25 Arguably, these
opportunities to inﬂuence the regulatory environment through lobbying are more likely to be available
to domestic actors (Dominguez 1982). Foreign investors could also opt to actively engage in lobbying
for either political favors or political reform and better governance. Their choice depends on the
tradeoff between familiar collective action costs and the costs of redeployment.
The counter argument is that higher competition could create incentives to engage in corrupt prac-
tices to stay ahead: when facing higher competitive pressure private actors could engage in lobbying
for policies and regulations that would allow them to carve out a market niche for themselves. This
effect is less likely to be observed above a threshold of competition since more ﬁrms are negatively
affected by the corrupt exchange between government ofﬁcials and their competitors. The saliency of
this quid-pro-quo exchange is likely to be magniﬁed when the ﬁrm engaging in corruption is foreign.
Which effect dominates is ultimately an empirical issue.
We emphasize on the attenuating effect of competition on rent creation, therefore reducing corrup-
tion, while others have emphasized on the incentives to engage in corruption to stay competitive. Both
sets of hypotheses are theoretically plausible, though we think the former is more likely to be reﬂected
in reduction of grand corruption and the latter on petty corruption. The task is, thus, identifying empir-
ically the conditions under which FDI will be associated with higher or lower corruption levels in the
host country. A similar story could be made about the effect of political competition. We do not deny
this possibility either. Yet, our claim that institutions affect corruption is consistent with a vast body
25See Mauro (1995). There is a profuse literature on foreign investors’ choice of the form of entry that persuasively
suggests that this is the case; see, inter alia, Delios and Henisz (2003), Henisz (2000), and Henisz and Delios (2004).
Foreign ﬁrms usually choose to partner with domestic ﬁrms that have a comparative advantage in dealing with the host
government. See Henisz (2000: 362).
10of theoretical literature (see Ades and Di Tella 1999; Bhagwati 1982; Krueger 1974; Rose-Ackerman
1978, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Tullock 1967) and has received empirical support when using
measures of perceived corruption particularly among stable democracies (Treisman 2007).
It is hard to disentangle the effect of economic from that of political development. Economic
development leads to the spread of education, literacy, and depersonalized relationships, all of which
should raise the probability that democratic practices will take root, and increase the possibility of
detecting abuse and refraining from corruption (Treisman 2000, 404). Greater civic engagement may
lead to closer monitoring and a higher probability of detecting and punishing corruption. Thus it
is plausible that in our empirical analysis economic development is capturing the effect of political
development. In any event we should expect that the marginal effect of FDI on corruption to be at
its lowest levels when political and economic competition loom large. We will produce preliminary
evidence in support of this hypothesis as well.
2.2 Alternative explanations
The profuse empirical literature on the determinants of corruption identiﬁes a series of conditions
affecting the incidence of corruption, which informs our analysis and choice of controls.26 Among
those conditions we ﬁnd:
Political and economic development: Democracy and economic development can have a direct effect
on corruption. Economic development is usually associated with higher competition, diversiﬁcation
of markets, and absorptive capacity, all leading to lower rents and thus decreased opportunities for
corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999). The risk of exposure of the public/private exchange implicit
in corruption is also higher in a more democratic, open political system (Treisman 2000). Hence,
we would expect that corruption will be lower in more democratic countries, where access to public
ofﬁce is more competitive, and in countries with a freer press and more vigorous civic associations.27
Legal origin: “The most obvious cost of corruption is the risk of getting caught and punished,” which
is partly determined by the country’s legal system (Treisman 2000: 402). It has been argued that
26See Lambsdorff (2006) and Treisman (2007) for reviews of this literature.
27Singapore is arguably an exception to this pattern. Since independence Singapore has been an autocratic regime char-
acterized by highly competitive access to political positions, especially when compared with Latin American democracies.
Singapore has a system of recruitment to public ofﬁce that extols probity and heavily punishes petty corruption.
11common law and civil law systems are distinctive in the degree of protection of private properties and
restraints on public ofﬁcials (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999). Since its development in the 17th
century, the common law system was intended to protect individual properties and limit the power
of the state, while civil law systems introduced in the 19th century by Napoleon and Bismarck in
Continental Europe “can be taken as a proxy for an intent to build institutions to further the power
of the State” (La Porta et al. 1999: 231-2; see also David and Brierley 1985; Treisman 2000: 402).
Thus, a common law tradition will be associated with better governance, limited government, and
lower levels of corruption (La Porta et al. 1999). The link between legal systems and governance
outcomes are quite controversial and have been contradicted by recent work. Yet, we add them as
controls following the extant literature (Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Larra´ ın and Tavares 2004).
Religion: Religious practices have the potential “to shape national views regarding property rights,
competition, and the role of state” (Beck et al. 2003: 151; see La Porta et al. 1999; Stulz and
Williamson 2003). “In religious traditions such as Protestantism, which arose in some versions as
dissenting sects opposed to the state-sponsored religion, institutions of the church may play a role
in monitoring and denouncing abuses by state ofﬁcials” (Treisman 2000: 403). The Catholic and
Muslim religions are likely to “limit the security of property rights and private contracting” (Levine
2005: 71; see Landes 1998). This hypothesis is highly contested on both theoretical and empirical
grounds; yet to replicate earlier work in the literature we keep religion as a control.
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization: The illegal contracts of corruption are unenforceable in courts.
Treisman (2000: 406) argues that ethnic communities and networks may serve as one of the mecha-
nismsto“enhancethecredibilityoftheprivatepartner’scommitment... Inethnicallydividedsocieties,
ethnic communities may provide cheap information about and even internal sanctions against those
who betray their coethnics” (see also Fearon and Laitin 1996). Thus, the literature would expect more
corruption in societies with ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
Other explanatory variables include natural resource endowment and openness. The literature
posits that there is a positive association between natural resource endowment and corruption (Ades
and Di Tella 1999; Leite and Weidmann 1999), and a negative correlation between trade openness
12and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Treisman 2000, 2007).28
3 Empirical Strategy
We believe that most studies on the effect of FDI on corruption fail on two accounts: ﬁrstly, previous
research constrains the relationship to be linear once the relevant confounders have been accounted
for, which runs counter to the theoretical literature on the nature and consequences of FDI. Secondly,
while corruption has the potential to reduce FDI inﬂows, these studies do not deal with endogeneity
problems (e.g., Alesina and Weder 1999; Smarzynska and Wei 2000; Wei 1997). In the ensuing
sections we discuss our empirical strategy that directly addresses these shortcomings.
3.1 Estimating the effect of FDI on corruption
We ﬁt a series of models to assess the empirical content of our hypothesis that the effect of FDI on
corruption depends on the economic environment in the host country. We regress corruption on FDI
per capita (FDIi), democracy, the natural log of real GDP per capita, and the interaction term of FDI
and log of GDP per capita, since we expect the marginal effect of FDI to be non-linear.
Corruptioni = 0 + 1 FDIi + 2 Democi + 3 Ln(GDPcapi) + (1)
+ 4 FDIi  Ln(GDPcapi) + Xi + "i
The effect of inward FDI on corruption is obtained by taking the partial derivative of Corruptioni
with respect to FDIi yielding:
@Corruptioni
@FDIi
= 1 + 4  Ln(GDPcapi) (2)
where1 > 0and4 < 0, suchthat1+4Ln(GDP=capi) 7 0asLn(GDPcapi) 7 Ln(GDP=cap);
and Ln(GDP=cap) is a value in the sample corresponding to  1=4, where the net estimated effect
of FDI on corruption should ﬂip sign. If, on the other hand, the effect of FDI does not depend on the
28The empirical content of this prediction is contested. See Knack and Azfar (2003).
13level of economic development in the host country we should expect 4 = 0.29
3.2 Data description and sources
Our dependent variable is Transparency International’s annual index of “perceived corruption,” which
is widely used in earlier studies (see, inter alia, Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Treisman 2000). The index
varies from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). In order to simplify the interpretation of results, we
reverse the values. Therefore, higher values mean more corruption. The Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) has missing values for some countries and years.30 Thus, to maximize the data coverage, we
follow Sandholtz and Gray (2003): we average the scores from 2000 to 2004 for each country that
has observations during this period.31 To check for robustness of our ﬁndings we also use corruption
scores from the World Bank and the International Country Risk Guide as alternative measures of the
dependent variable.
Inward FDI is the annual net inﬂows in constant 2000 international dollars (PPP adjusted). As
reﬂected in the national accounts, net FDI inﬂows are total inward FDI ﬂows received—including eq-
29In Section 3.4.5 we explore the empirical content of an alternative hypothesis, namely that the marginal effect of FDI
varies with political development. Thus we regress corruption on FDI per capita (FDIi), democracy, the natural log of
real GDP per capita, and the interaction term of FDI and democracy:
Corruptioni = 0 + 1 FDIi + 2 Democi + 3 Ln(GDPcapi) + (3)
+ 4 FDIi  Democi + Xi + i
k (k) is a vector of regression coefﬁcients, Xi is a vector of k explanatory variables, and "i (i) is an error term. The
effect of FDI on corruption would thus be:
@Corruptioni
@FDIi
= 1 + 4  Democi (4)
For equation (4) the predictions are: 1 > 0 and 4 < 0; 1 + 4  Democi 7 0 as Democi 7 Democ; Democ =
 1=4.
30The CPI codes instances of grand corruption, graft and petty corruption; yet, our argument is about grand corruption
and makes no prediction on the effect of foreign investment on petty corruption. According to Transparency International,
CPI is a good proxy of grand corruption, which is the at the center of the organization’s activities. They note, however,
that the incidence of grand corruption and petty corruption are likely to go hand in hand. Thus, CPI could be considered
a coarse proxy of the underlying level of corruption in the host country, which is the underlying concept of interest in our
study.
31See Treisman (2007: 213-21), for a discussion of the CPI and other measures of corruption. An alternative empirical
strategy would exploit the within unit variance in the dependent and independent variables. Unfortunately this strategy
is not feasible at this stage for several reasons: ﬁrst, none of the available measures are amenable to time-series cross-
sectional analysis due to changes in coding, coverage and other data collection problems discussed in detail by Treisman
(2007); second, in the CPI dataset there is limited change in the level of corruption during the time frame for which the
measures of corruption are available; and last, aside from limitations in the available data we believe that the effect of FDI
on corruption should be apparent in the cross-section, and the results seem to support this claim.
14uity, long and short-term capital, and reinvest of earnings—minus divestment, i.e., foreign investment
pulling out from the host, which includes dividends, interests and other payments to the parent com-
pany or equity holder. Note that net FDI could take negative values when divestment—i.e.: foreign
investment pulling out of the host country—is larger than inward investment ﬂows.32 We normalize
the total amount of inward FDI by the size of the host country.33 We average FDI per capita for each
country for a ﬁve-year span between 2000 and 2004.34 To ease the interpretation of our results, we
re-scale it to 100 constant international dollars.
Economic development is measured by GDP per capita in constant 2000 international dollars
(PPP). We take the natural log of GDP per capita to account for its skewed distribution. The data
comes from the Penn World Tables and we average it for a ﬁve-year span from 2000 to 2004. This
variable is mean-centered to simplify the analysis and interpretation of the results, particularly those
on the interactive terms.
Standard Polity IV scores of political regimes are used to capture the degree of democracy in host
countries. We take the difference between Democ and Autoc as a measure of democracy which varies
form -10 to +10, representing from strongly autocratic to strongly democratic.35 We averaged the
values for the 2000-2004 interval and rescaled them into 0-20 range.36
The use of the composite measure of democracy has been challenged in recent studies. Treier
and Jackman (2008), for instance, argue that due to inappropriate aggregation and measurement error,
there is “an error-in-variables problem” potentially leading to biased and inconsistent estimates when
32Net FDI inﬂows are not two-way ﬂows. Net inﬂows are inward ﬂows, net of interest and dividend payments, capital
repatriation and other forms of divestment, which occurs when foreign investors pull out from the host country. They do
not include outward direct investment ﬂows, which are recorded as FDI outﬂows in national accounts.
33The PPP conversion factor is calculated in the following way: conversion factor=GDP(PPP, Constant 2000 Interna-
tional $)/GDP(Current US $). These variables are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Net FDI Inﬂows
(PPP) = Conversion Factor  FDI (Current US$).
34To capture foreign investment activity during the period when corruption is observed we use FDI inﬂows averaged
over 5-year span, rather than stocks. Data on direct investment ﬂows is recorded on national accounts and usually more
complete and reliable than the data available on foreign investment stocks. To better capture foreign investment activity
we average ﬂows over ﬁve years; this also allows us to control for short-term volatility. In any event, FDI inﬂows and
stocks are highly correlated in our sample. The Pearson correlations between real FDI inﬂows per capita and real FDI
stocks per capita during the period of 2000-2004 are 0.86 and 0.96 in the samples of 94 and 91 observations respectively,
which should not be a surprise since prior investment activity is a strong predictor of investment ﬂows. Moreover, all
regression results using FDI stock per capita are substantively the same. These results are available from the authors upon
request.
35The source is Marshall and Jaggers (2004). This measure is widely used in previous studies on the politics of FDI.
See Jensen (2003), Li and Resnick (2003), among others.
36Missing values are linearly interpolated to maximize coverage.
15democracy is used as an explanatory variable (Treier and Jackman 2008: 202-3). The problem is
compounded when trying to estimate the effect of intermediate levels of democracy, such as anoc-
racies and transitions to and from democracy, or non-linearities in the effect of the regime variable.
To address this concern in our robustness tests we use alternative indicators from the Polity IV data
aimed at capturing the degree of political competition in the polity: Parcomp and Polcomp.37 We ﬁt
additional models using Freedom House’s index of political rights and Tatu Vanhanen’s indices of
participation and democracy.38 It is plausible that the incentives created by changes in political insti-
tutions take time to consolidate, leading to a cumulative effect of long standing democratic practices
and values. Thus, in alternative speciﬁcations we use a dummy variable coded as 1 for countries that
have been democratic throughout the 1930-1995 period, and 0 otherwise.39
We control for religion, legal origin, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, for which we use data
from La Porta et al. (1999). Religious afﬁliation is measured by the proportion of the Protestant,
Catholic, and Muslim population in each country in 1980.40 Legal origin is captured by three dummy
variables: British (common law), French, and other legal systems. Other legal origins serve as the
baseline (excluded) category. The variable measuring ethnicity is created by averaging ﬁve different
indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (La Porta et al. 1999, 238). To proxy for countries’ raw
material endowments we use the proportion of exports consisting of fuels, metals and minerals (see
Ades and Di Tella 1999; Treisman 2000).41 Openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports
of goods and services as a share of GDP. To deal with its skewed distribution, we take the natural log
of openness.42
37Vreeland (2008) argues that two components used to construct democracy scores—Parcomp and Parreg are partially
deﬁned in terms of civil war, which drives the correlation between anocracies and civil war. This problem is a less concern
for this paper.
38The data sources are, respectively: Freedom House (2008), and Vanhanen (2000, 2003).
39The source for this variable is Treisman (2007).
40See La Porta et al. (1999, 238). The original data is in percentages, ranging from 0 to 100. To ease the interpretation
of results we have rescaled the data to a 0 to 1 range.
41This data is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, averaged for the 2000-2004 interval.
42Data on openness is drawn from the Penn World Tables.
163.3 FDI and Corruption: OLS regressions
We start with ‘naive’ OLS regressions; the results from this analyses are presented in Table 1. First,
we simply regress corruption on FDI and log of real GDP per capita and democracy, controlling
for other covariates identiﬁed in the literature (Models 1-1 and 1-2). In this setting we are able
to reproduce the ﬁndings from earlier studies: they show a negative correlation between FDI and
corruption, consistent with the ﬁndings in earlier studies. To account for the interactive effect with
development, on the right-hand side of the equation we add an interaction term between FDI and the
natural log of GDP per capita. The results, reproduced in Model 1-3) are consistent with hypothesis
(1) that the effect of FDI depends on the level of economic development.43 Most studies would stop
here, yet endogeneity concerns should make these results suspect. Indeed, our analysis below shows
that the signs and signiﬁcance levels change once we correct for endogeneity and allow for the effect
of FDI to be non-linear, varying with economic in the host country.
[Table 1 about here]
In the ensuing sections we present additional analyses aimed at dealing with the endogeneity
problem. First, we discuss the construction of the instrumental variable for FDI, and present the
results from the ﬁrst-stage regressions. Next, we move to the second-stage results, where we evaluate
the linear effect of FDI on corruption as proposed by the extant literature and test our hypothesis on
the non-linear effect of FDI after dealing with endogeneity.
3.4 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Estimator
One possible solution to endogeneity is to ﬁt an instrumental variable model in a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) setting. The basic strategy in instrumental variable estimation is to ﬁnd an estimator
that is contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term from the original model and correlated
(preferably highly so) with the regressor for which it is to serve as an instrument. Furthermore, the
instrument should not have a direct effect on the dependent variable (Angrist and Krueger 2001;
Wooldridge 2002). Yet, ﬁnding an instrument for FDI that could be used in this setting is a daunting
43Model 1-4 reproduces the results for democracy: the negative association between FDI and corruption is mitigated
by democracy. In section 3.4.5 we show that this result is not robust.
17task. Recent studies on the consequences of FDI have proposed different candidates. Malesky (2005),
for example, uses the predicted exchange rate as an instrumental variable for cumulative stocks of
FDI, ﬁnding that FDI has a strong inﬂuence on the progress and institutionalization of economic
reform. Jensen and Rosas (2007), on the other hand, use geography (distance to the U.S. border) as
instrumental variable for inward FDI into Mexico to study its effect on inequality. The identifying
strategy in these studies exploits variance in either geography or economic conditions in the host
country, which are sensible choices given their sample but not for ours.
WeconstructaninstrumentforinwardFDI,whichisbasedonameasureof(theinverseof)remote-
ness, namely a weighted geographical distance between the host country and the richest economies
in the world for the period of 2000-2004.44 The instrument is grounded in recent literature on the
determinants of FDI and loosely based on the gravity model of investment: while most of the world’s
FDI originates from the wealthiest economies in the world, the amount received by host countries is
indirectly related to the distance from these source countries (e.g., Carr, Markusen and Maskus 2001,
2003; Caves 1992; Loungani, Mody and Razin 2002; Markusen 1995; Mody 2004). The choice of
remoteness as an instrument of FDI is based on the following logic: investors are more likely to invest
in those destinations that are closer to their home country; and wealthier countries are more likely to
be sources of FDI.45
Larra´ ın and Tavares (2004) have developed a similar instrument: they use geographical and cul-
tural proximity to the largest countries in the world, and the source countries’ levels of exports
44We use the summation of bilateral geographic distance between the host country and the 20 wealthiest economies,
weighted by their average real GDP per capita in 2000-2004. The list of the 20 economies is: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States. We exclude Bermuda, Macao and Brunei
from the list of the top 20 economies. Note that the top 20 wealthiest economies account for 74.11% of the world’s
cross-border investment outﬂows during this period.
45Distance from a source of investment couldhave different effects depending on the motivation for investment. Vertical
FDI, for instance, exists to take advantage of factor price differentials across countries, and thus explained by arguments
based on factor proportions. Horizontal FDI arises when high trade barriers make exports to foreign markets costly.
Consequently, ﬁrms are forced to have similar production facilities in more than one country to cater to local consumers
(Markusen 1995). The latter is also associated with the “tariff-jumping” FDI, and hence likely to correlated positively with
distance. See Bhagwati et al. (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1996), Helpman (1984). Historically, most FDI ﬂowed
among countries with similar endowments, i.e., horizontal FDI; see Lipsey (2001) and Markusen (1995). Therefore,
instrumented FDI could be interpreted as capturing the average treatment effect of vertically motivated ﬂows. Yet, Hanson
et al. (2001) have shown that vertical FDI is becoming increasingly more important. Slaughter (2003) also documents a
higher prevalence of vertical FDI in recent years. In any event we should expect that given two potential targets investors
are likely to choose the closer destination.
18and investment outﬂows to instrument FDI inﬂows in host countries. While distance to the largest
economies is, in theory, exogenous to corruption in the host countries, economic integration (exports
and FDI outﬂows) and the cultural factors included in the ﬁrst-stage regression (such as common
religion and language) could have a direct and independent effect on corruption in the second-stage
regression, and thus violate the exclusion restriction.
In abstract, remoteness could also be construed as violating the exclusion restriction. Distance
from the 20 wealthiest economies where corruption is less prevalent could proxy for the ease of dif-
fusion of institutions, practices and values that are usually associated with lower levels of corruption.
However, remoteness and proximity alone do not necessarily result in the diffusion of those institu-
tions, values and practices. We need to identify the mechanisms through which these best practices
are transmitted. One such mechanism is economic interdependence, including trade and investment
ﬂows. Yet, remoteness does not seem to be a good instrument for trade. The correlation between our
instrument and imports as a percentage of GDP is low (r=0.14) and it is not statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero.46 This is consistent with Treisman’s ﬁnding that weighted distance between a
country and the 20 largest exporters is not a good instrument for trade openness (2000, 2007).47
Instrumenting FDI with remoteness is equivalent to identifying MNCs as the vectors for diffusion
of political practices (see Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons et al. 2006). These effects, we argue,
depend on the motivations for engaging in FDI and are likely to be affected by conditions in the host
country. This is an additional difference from Larra´ ın and Tavares (2004)’s study, which does not
allow for the effect of FDI to vary with levels of economic and political development, as is central to
our argument.
An alternative mechanism for diffusion of governance would be the existence of cultural and
46Note that the correlation between the instrument and the log of trade openness (the ratio of total imports and exports to
GDP) is statically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the effect is through exports, which could be attributed to direct investment.
To further check whether our instrument captures the variation of trade openness, we have constructed two different
instruments for FDI and trade ﬂows respectively. We weigh the bilateral distance between a host country and the richest
20 economies (in terms of GDP per capita) by their FDI outﬂows as an instrument for the country’s FDI inﬂows. Similarly,
we weigh the bilateral distance between a country and the 20 largest economies (in terms of GDP or population) by their
exports as an instrument for the country’s imports. Again, the former predicts FDI inﬂows well but the latter is not
signiﬁcantly correlated with imports.
47Alternatively, we weigh distance by the log of the population of the largest 20 economies, obtaining substantively and
statistically similar results. One potential advantage of using population is that it could be taken as a proxy for real GDP
while it is unlikely to have a direct effect on corruption in host countries. Larger populations would result in lower capital
to population ratios, i.e., less endowed with capital.
19colonial links, which could vary with geography. Yet, note that our operationalization of remoteness
includescountriesfromdifferentregionsoftheworldwithdifferentlanguages, values, legaltraditions,
institutional backgrounds and colonial statuses.48 Moreover, it should be noted that this possibility
is not a serious threat to our estimation strategy: the effect of diffusion of practices through legal
traditions and cultural links is hypothesized to be linear, and would bias our results downward in less
developed and autocratic countries since more remote countries are less likely to be inﬂuenced by
Western models traditionally associated with best practices and control of corruption.
Another potential critique to our instrument is that even though corruption in host countries is
unlikely to be affected by remoteness, the variance of the information available to researchers at
Transparency International, the PRS group or the World Bank to construct the indices of perceived
corruption might be affected by distance. This would result in a better assessment of the underlying
level of corruption in places where MNCs are active. The problem is mitigated in Transparency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which uses surveys of residents and local sources as well.
Moreover, a recent study by Fisman and Miguel (2006) provides some validation of the subjective
measures of corruption used in our analysis. Additionally, instrumented FDI enters the second-stage
regressioninanon-linearformprovidingfurtherassurancethattheexclusionrestrictionisnotviolated
on this account.
Therefore, we have good reasons to believe that our instrument is an improvement to those used
in earlier studies of the consequences of FDI: it is exogenous to the underlying level of corruption in
the host country and is positively correlated with FDI inﬂows.49
Thus, in the ﬁrst-stage regression, we ﬁt the following model:
FDIi =  +  
20 X
j=1
1
distij
 GDP per capitaj + Xi + i (5)
where i = 1;2;:::;N and j = 1;2;:::;20
48The correlation between the inverse of remoteness and English legal origin is negative and signiﬁcant at the 95%
level in the sample when outliers (Belgium, Ireland and Singapore) are excluded (N = 91). The correlation coefﬁcient is,
however, low at r=-0.20 in the sample of 94 observations.
49Our instrument improves on those used in previous literature in two ways: ﬁrstly, remoteness is associated with
distance to the wealthiest economies in the world, which are likely to be potential sources of investment; secondly, while
distance is time invariant, remoteness shifts with changes in the centers of economic activity in the world, and could thus
be used in a panel setting.
20In equation (5),   is the coefﬁcient to be estimated for the instrument,  is the intercept and Xi
is a vector of k exogenous variables included in the second-stage regression. Bilateral distance is the
inter-capital distance between pairs of countries.50 For those countries that are not among the top 20
economies, i.e., i 6= j, their net real FDI per capita should be negatively correlated with their distance
with to and positively correlated with the wealth of the wealthiest economies in the world.51 Thus,
we regress net real FDI per capita on the instrument and then use the regression coefﬁcients to predict
FDI per capita, our main independent variable for the second-stage. Ancillary tests suggest that our
instrument is strong and valid.52
[Table 2 about here]
3.4.1 First-Stage Results
To show the validity of our instrument, we ﬁrst look at the bivariate correlation between real FDI
per capita and our measure of remoteness. The pairwise Pearson correlation is 0.618, and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.53 Next, we simply regress FDI on the instrument and use the coefﬁcients to predict
exogenous FDI. The coefﬁcient on our instrument is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, with an
F-statistic of 56.87. A bivariate plot of the constructed FDI per capita against the true FDI per capita
shows that our instrument predicts FDI inﬂows quite well (see Figure 2). However, it suggests that
Belgium, Ireland, and Singapore could be statistical outliers. These are three small countries that
receive more FDI per capita in the 2000-2004 period than what is predicted by their distance to the
world’s wealthiest economies. When we exclude these three countries, the Pearson correlation in-
creases to 0.658. Next, we regress real FDI per capita on remoteness but exclude the three potential
50We calculated bilateral distance data using the ArcGIS 9.2 program. For Hong Kong, it is the distance between the
city and the capitals of other sovereign countries.
51For each of the 20 wealthiest economies, i.e., when i = j, we set the term 1=distanceij  GDP per capitaj = 0.
Since we are measuring outward investment, this is equivalent to coding the distance of a country to itself as inﬁnite so
that 1=distanceij  0. This implies that for a country like the United States case, included among the top wealthiest
economies, 1=distanceij = 0 would capture the fact that the U.S. receives no FDI from itself.
52The F-statistic of the instrument in the ﬁrst stage-regression in Model 2-1 is 28.04, in Model 2-2 is 37.58. The F-
statistic of the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage regressions in models 2-4 and 2-6 are 19.08 and 11.47
respectively (see Table 2). See Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997).
53The pairwise Pearson correlation is based on the sample included in our analyses, i.e., after all missing values in the
explanatory variables are deleted (N = 94).
21outliers, which yields similar results.54
[Figures 2 & 3 about here]
To further check the outliers, we calculated the Cook distance for each observation in our sample
in the ﬁrst-stage regression (Cook 1977, 1979; see Table C in the Appendix).55 The Cook distance
coefﬁcients suggests that Belgium, Singapore and Ireland are indeed outliers.56 Excluding Singapore
from our tests requires additional explanation given that it is usually characterized as an authoritarian
regime with very low levels of corruption. However, note that Singapore is usually coded as having
a highly competitive system for recruitment of political leaders, even in comparison with democratic
systems in other regions of the world, as discussed above (see footnote 27). Additionally, Singapore
has a diversiﬁed economy which is highly integrated to the global economy. Both conditions would
point to a negative marginal effect of FDI and corruption. In the analyses reported below, we explore
the existence of outliers more rigorously, and evaluate the consequence of including and excluding
these observations from the analysis in both stages; our results remain robust to these alternative
modeling strategies.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
3.4.2 Second Stage: The Effect of Instrumented FDI on Corruption
We move now to the results from the second-stage regressions. In Model 3-1 in Table 3, we instrument
FDI in a 2SLS setting and estimate its effect on corruption.57 These results show that, while the
coefﬁcient on instrumented FDI remains negative, it is no longer signiﬁcantly different from zero.
After controlling for legal origin (Model 3-2), we ﬁnd that the effect of instrumented FDI is both
negative and statistically signiﬁcant, in line with the ﬁndings by Larra´ ın and Tavares (2004). The
54Figure 3 plots true FDI per capita and constructed FDI per capita; the correlation between the two measures is, again,
stronger: all observations lie around the 45-degree line.
55In the model, we regress FDI on the instruments and all the predetermined variables in the second-stage regression.
The Cook distance coefﬁcient (Di) measures the inﬂuence of observation i on the predicted value of other observations
in the sample given the parameters in the model. Formally Di = [(^ j   ^ j i)0X0X(^ j   ^ j i)]=(ks2), where ^ j are
the coefﬁcients estimated from the full sample and ^ j i are the estimated coefﬁcients without ith observation. k is the
number of parameters and s2 = e0e=(n   k). See Cook (1977, 1979).
56Figures (5) and (6) graph the leverage and added-variable plots from the ﬁrst-stage regression.
57In the instrumental variable 2SLS regressions all exogenous variables from the second-stage are included in the ﬁrst-
stage regressions. Model 2-1 in Table 2 presents the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression. The coefﬁcient of our instrument
is statistically signiﬁcant and the F-statistic of the excluded instrument of the ﬁrst-stage regression is 28.04, suggesting
that our instrument is strong. See Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997).
22coefﬁcients of other controls are generally consistent with those in the OLS regressions.
Yet, these models ignore our hypothesis that the effect of FDI on corruption depends the level
of economic development of the host country. In less developed economies, where markets are less
competitive, the entry of foreign investors is more likely to crowd out domestic ﬁrms and lead to
greater opportunities for rent creation, and hence higher levels of corruption. In earlier sections we
have argued that GDP per capita is a good proxy for the degree of economic development and com-
petitiveness of the host economy. Developed economies tend to be more diversiﬁed and have more
robust local business capacities. The crowding out effect of foreign investment will be less prevalent
in those cases. Moreover, the entry of multinationals could even increase competitive pressures, fur-
ther reducing the opportunities for rent creation and appropriation. Thus, we expect that the marginal
effect of FDI on corruption to co-vary with the level of development in the host country, and hence its
real GDP per capita.
To estimate this relationship we replace FDIi with predicted [ FDIi (estimated above) in equation
(1), yielding:
Corruptioni = 0 + 1 [ FDIi + 2 Democi + 3 Ln(GDPcapi) + (6)
+ 4 [ FDIi  Ln(GDPcapi) + Xi + "i
where, as before, k is a vector of regression coefﬁcients, Xi is a vector of k explanatory variables,
and "i is an error term.
Estimating this interaction presents an additional technical challenge. Since [ FDI per capita is
endogenous to corruption, the interaction between [ FDI and the natural log of GDP per capita is also
endogenous to corruption. The estimates obtained by directly multiplying an instrumented endoge-
nous variable with another variable is inconsistent and the interaction term “must be purged as a single
variable, not piecemeal” (Achen 1986: 143; see Kelejian 1971). For example, suppose we deﬁne a re-
duced form for an endogenous variable x1 = (X;Z), where Z are excluded instruments and X are the
included exogenous variables from the second stage. The reduced form for x1x2 is x1x2 = (X;Z)x2.
A consistent estimate of the reduced form predicting x1x2 can be obtained by estimating this equation.
23Then the purged values of the interacted terms can be included in the second-stage regression, while
correcting for the standard errors as usual (Achen 1986: 141-44), which is the strategy that we adopt
here.58
The results presented in Model 3-3 in Table 3 provide strong support to the non-linear hypothesis.
Looking ﬁrst at the controls, we ﬁnd that the addition of the interaction term does not greatly affect
theirsignorsigniﬁcancelevels: Protestantismstillhasanegativeandsigniﬁcantimpactoncorruption.
Theslopeofnaturalresourceendowmentisalsopositiveandsigniﬁcant. Thecoefﬁcientonthenatural
log of real GDP per capita is -1.321 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The most important
change is that the sign of instrumented FDI per capita becomes positive (0.082) and is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coefﬁcient on the FDI-GDP interaction term is negative (-0.076) and
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The positive sign on the coefﬁcient of FDI and the negative signs on both
the coefﬁcient of log GDP per capita and the coefﬁcient of the interaction term strongly support our
hypothesis as described in equation (2). At low levels of GDP per capita FDI tends to be associated
with higher levels of corruption. However, when GDP per capita is above $15,188, the value that
corresponds to Greece’s in our sample the net effect of FDI inﬂows on corruption turns negative.The
marginal effect for the less developed countries is substantively signiﬁcant as well: one standard
deviation change in GDP per capita results in one half standard deviation increase in corruption for
the average case among the less developed countries.
In sum, the results suggest that the effect of FDI on corruption is not linear. Increasing inward FDI
is associated with higher levels of corruption in less developed countries, while in an advanced econ-
omy, increasing inward FDI has no substantial effect on corruption. The ﬁnding that the correlation
between FDI and corruption is positive in less developed economies is consistent with our hypothesis
that the presence of foreign investors in less developed and economically diversiﬁed countries has the
potential to create opportunities for rent extraction. These results also suggest that corruption in less
developed economies is more likely to be affected by external factors such as FDI inﬂows than in
58 The standard error of ^ j is the square root of the jth diagonal element in the matrix: ^ 2(
Pn
i=1 ^ x0
i^ xi) 1 =
^ 2( ^ X0 ^ X) 1, where ^ 2 = (n   k   1) 1 Pn
i=1 ^ u2
i, and ^ ui = yi   xi^ ;i = 1;2;:::;n. The ^ ui used to compute ^ 2
are not the residuals from the second-stage regression where the xi have been replaced by the ^ xi but those obtained when
using the estimated coefﬁcients ^  and the endogenous xi. See Wooldridge (2002: 95). Note that we do not interact FDI
with GDP per capita and democracy scores in the same regression, since they are highly correlated. This would require
adding a three-way interaction which would make purging an insurmountable problem in this setting.
24advanced economies. In the ensuing sections we explore the robustness of our ﬁndings.
[Table 3 about here]
3.4.3 Endogenous GDP
The estimates from Model 3-3 could also be biased, since GDP per capita could potentially be en-
dogenous to corruption (Treisman 2007). To address this problem we present the results from ﬁtting
a model where we instrument both FDI and GDP (see Model 3-4 in Table 3). We use countries’ abso-
lute latitudes to as an instrument variable for GDP per capita.59 Remoteness and absolute latitude are
likely to be correlated. However, the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression reported in Models 2-3a and
2-3b in Table 2 suggest that remoteness better captures the variance in FDI rather than the variance
in GDP per capita. When predicting FDI per capita in the ﬁrst-stage regression, the coefﬁcient of
remoteness is highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level, but the one of absolute latitude is not. In contrast, the
coefﬁcient of absolute latitude is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in predicting real GDP per
capita but the coefﬁcient of remoteness is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.60
InModel3-4, bothFDIandGDPareinstrumented. WeﬁndthatFDIpercapitahasapositiveslope
of 0.046, and the interaction term has a negative coefﬁcient of -0.036 which is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. The coefﬁcient on instrumented GDP per capita is negative and signiﬁcantly different
from zero beyond conventional levels.61 We test for their joint signiﬁcance, and ﬁnd that they are
jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These tests provide additional evidence that the effect of FDI co-
varies with the level of economic development in the host country after accounting for endogeneity.
3.4.4 Economic Concentration
FDI inﬂows are more likely to increase corruption in less developed countries, particularly those with
concentrated markets. Although the level of economic development is closely related to economic
59For a discussion of this instrument, see Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Treisman (2000).
60The results do not change even when we add legal origin into the ﬁrst-stage regression. The coefﬁcient of absolute
latitude only becomes signiﬁcant at the 5 % level (p-value= 0:050) in predicting exogenous FDI when we exclude the
three outliers. However, the coefﬁcient of distance remain insigniﬁcant in predicting exogenous GDP without outliers.
61The three variables—and democracy—are highly correlated, raising concerns of multicollinearity (see the correlation
matrix reproduced in Table F in the Appendix). In the presence of multicollinearity, we still have consistent estimates of
the coefﬁcients but imprecise estimates of the standard errors.
25diversiﬁcation, GDP per capita may not be the best proxy for countries with large endowments of
oil and natural resources such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Middle Eastern
countries. We use the Export Concentration Index (ECI) constructed by UNCTAD as an alternative
proxy for economic concentration. We interact this measure with FDI per capita as in Equation 1.62
To deal with possible reverse causality, we lag ECI one ﬁve-year period. Note that high values in ECI
represent more concentrated exports. Thus, according to Hypothesis (1), we should expect that FDI
has a negative sign while the interaction term is positive. The results presented in Model 3-5 strongly
in Table 3 support the non-linear hypothesis. FDI has a positive coefﬁcient, statistically signiﬁcant
at 5% level. The interaction term between FDI and ECI is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
The results show that FDI inﬂows are associated with higher levels of corruption in countries with
concentrated markets, as proxied by their export portfolios; the effect disappears in countries with
more diversiﬁed economies.
Therefore, we ﬁnd strong and robust evidence that FDI inﬂows are associated with more corrup-
tion in less developed countries. Furthermore, our results suggest that the effect of FDI on corruption
is substantively larger in less developed economies than in advanced countries with more diversiﬁed
markets. One plausible explanation for this ﬁnding is that since property rights and secure legal insti-
tutions are already well established and markets are more competitive in these countries, corruption
levels are already relatively low; thus, the additional marginal effect of FDI on corruption resulting
from increasing competition and efﬁciency is likely to be less consequential, a possibility that we
examine in the next section. One major caveat to this analysis is that output per capita in the host is
a coarse proxy for economic diversiﬁcation, concentration and the existence or lack of opportunities
for rent creation.
3.4.5 Political Development, FDI and Corruption
Political and economic development tend to go hand in hand. It is thus conceivable that GDP per
capita is a proxy for political development and the quality of political institutions. The interactive
effect of FDI and development could be actually picking the effect of political development, which
62The Pearson correlation between GDP per capita and ECI is -0.616 in the sample.
26is likely to happen in more developed economies (Przeworski et al. 2000). Yet, we argue that there
is a different mechanism at play. While the economic environment affects the potential beneﬁts of
engaging in corruption, political development enhances the opportunity of detecting and punishing
corrupt behavior, thus affecting the costs of corruption. Political institutions determine who is in
charge of regulating economic activity and who has the ability to collect taxes. The incentives cre-
ated by political institutions frame the conditions under which government ofﬁcials are more likely
to pocket revenue and rents, and the ease with which graft and bribes will remain undetected. Under
permissive political conditions where the probability of getting caught is low and the market struc-
ture is conducive to rent creation and extraction, the entry of foreign investors undeterred by those
conditions could create the opportunity for the exchange of public and private favors associated with
corruption.63
Electoral competition for executive and legislative ofﬁce, one of the deﬁning elements of democ-
racy or “poliarchy” according to Robert Dahl, is likely to increase the incentives to detect and expose
corrupt practices, and has the potential to discipline elected ofﬁcials directly—through the threat of
voting them out of ofﬁce—and the bureaucracies indirectly through electoral pressure on those con-
trollingtheagencies(Dahl1971, 1998; Powell2000). Inlesscompetitivepoliticalsystemsthecostsof
engaging in corruption and pocketing rents for personal beneﬁt would be lower.64 Democracy is also
associated with freedom of association and free press engender public interest groups and reporters
with a mission and the right to expose abuse (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Treisman 2007). Incumbents
and investors can engage in the quid-pro-quo exchanges that characterize corruption with less fear
that they would be prosecuted and sanctioned for their behavior. At the other end of the spectrum,
FDI will be associated with lower corruption in more competitive political systems, where political
leaders competing for scarce foreign capital internalize the beneﬁts they are likely to bring to the local
economy.65
Considering that autocracies are likely to be less competitive politically, we predict that foreign
63 That foreign and domestic ﬁrms are as likely to engage in corruption ﬁnds support in recent analyses on survey data
from transition economies: there is no signiﬁcant difference in total amount of bribes paid between foreign and domestic
ﬁrms. See Hellman et al. (2002) and Søreide (2006).
64NotethatTreisman(2000)ﬁndsthatthisrelationshiponlyholdsempiricallyforlong-lastingdemocraciesandmeasure
of perceived corruption.
65This is the traditional mechanism identiﬁed in the literature on the consequences of FDI. See Malesky (2005).
27investment will be associated with higher levels of corruption in autocratic regimes. Conversely,
we would expect FDI to be associated with lower levels of corruption in developed and democratic
countries. Political and economic development are likely to dampen the marginal effect of foreign
investment on corruption.
In Models 3-6, we explore whether the effect of FDI on corruption is conditional on the level of
developmentofpoliticalinstitutionsinthehostcountry. ThesignsandcoefﬁcientsofFDI,democracy,
and their interaction are in the expected direction. The interaction term between FDI and democracy
is statistically signiﬁcant, yet, FDI is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The coefﬁcient on democracy,
on the other hand, is not statistically signiﬁcant. In substantive terms, the results suggest that the
relationship between FDI and higher corruption levels is positive in less democratic countries and
turns to zero in more democratic countries.
To further check whether the effect of FDI on corruption varies across different levels of polit-
ical development, we use a dummy variable for countries that had been democratic in all years for
the period (1930- 1995). This variable is our proxy for the existence of consolidated democratic in-
stitutions, values and practices. This is arguably a better measure of political development than the
continuous measure from Polity IV, since democratic practices and principles may take time to take
root (Treisman 2000, 2007).
In Model 3-7, we use real FDI per capita and interact it with the dummy variable consolidated
democracy (1930-1995). The coefﬁcients on FDI, democracy and the interaction term all have the
expected signs but do not reach conventional signiﬁcance levels. Just like economic development,
FDI tends to increase corruption in less democratic countries but decrease corruption in countries
with long established democratic traditions.
3.4.6 Outliers
We have identiﬁed several inﬂuential observations in the ﬁrst-stage regression.66 Belgium, Ireland
and Singapore receive substantially more FDI per capita than the rest of the countries in the sample
66Figure 1 in the Appendix plots corruption on FDI per capita with and without these observations. We can see that
Belgium, Ireland and Singapore stand out as potential outliers. Thus, these three countries may be outliers for the second-
stage regression as well.
28(see Table C in the Appendix). We worry that these countries could be statistical outliers driving
our results in the second-stage regression. To formally check the existence of outliers, we calculate
the Cook’s Distance coefﬁcient for each observation in the sample for the second-stage regression
based on Models 3-3 and 3-6 and identiﬁed those observations that have a potentially larger inﬂuence
on the coefﬁcients estimated (see Table D in the Appendix). The Cook distance coefﬁcients for
both the ﬁrst- and second-stage regressions suggest that Belgium, Ireland and Singapore are indeed
outliers (see Figures C & D in the Appendix). Thus, we ﬁt model 4-1 which reproduces model 3-4
after dropping Belgium, Ireland and Singapore, the potential outliers identiﬁed in our tests.67 The
coefﬁcients on instrumented FDI, instrumented GDP per capita (in natural log) and their interaction
term all have the predicted sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. In Model 4-2, we interact FDI per
capita with economic concentration. Again, the results are consistent with Hypothesis (1): FDI is
associated with higher levels of corruption in less diversiﬁed economies.
[Figure 1 about here]
In Models 4-3 and 4-4, we interact real FDI per capita with the host country’s Polity IV democ-
racy score and with the proxy for consolidated democracy respectively. FDI, democracy and their
interaction term all have expected signs and are jointly signiﬁcant; FDI and the interaction term with
democracy are statistically signiﬁcant in Model 2-2, while the interaction term is signiﬁcant at the
1% level in Model 2-3. FDI inﬂows are associated with higher levels of corruption in less democratic
countries, but the association turns negative among democratic countries, suggesting that our ﬁndings
are robust to the exclusion of statistical outliers.
[Table 4 about here]
In Model 4-5, we add controls for legal origin: the slope on instrumented FDI per capita is positive
(0.265) with a p-value=0.088. The coefﬁcient on instrumented GDP per capita is -2.054, which
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the interaction term of FDI and GDP/capita has a
negative slope of -0.170 and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In substantive terms, when GDP per capita
67Excluding Belgium and Singapore reduces the size of our standard errors in the models where FDI is interacted with
democracy and long standing democratic traditions, but not in the models where FDI is interacted with GDP per capita.
Excluding Ireland, on the other hand, seems to be less inﬂuential on the sign and signiﬁcance levels in the second-stage
regression. Moreover, additional tests excluding Belgium, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan and Singapore, the six
outliers identiﬁed by a more restrictive criterion of Di > 4=(N k 1), provide even stronger support for our hypotheses.
Results are available from the authors.
29is below some threshold ($24,731, roughly corresponding to the level of Japan’s in our sample), FDI
inﬂows have a positive effect on corruption. For countries above that threshold, FDI inﬂows do not
seem to have an effect on corruption.68 Note, again, that the net value of the marginal effect of FDI
on corruption grows smaller as countries develop economically.69
We calculate the net effect of FDI per capita on corruption and 95% conﬁdence intervals by set-
ting GDP per capita at the level of Peru ($4,241, which corresponds to a value of -0.20 in the log
transformation centered at zero) and Denmark ($28,001, corresponding to 1.68 in the logged and cen-
tered transformation), each representing the average of the log of real GDP per capita for the group
of countries below and above the threshold at which the estimated net effect ﬂips signs. In the case
of Peru, the net effect of one unit increase of FDI per capita ($100 PPP) is 0.299 with a 95% con-
ﬁdence interval of [0.100, 0.494]. For a country like Denmark, the net effect is -0.022, with a 95%
conﬁdence interval of [-0.197, 0.148]. Substantively, one standard deviation change in real FDI per
capita (roughly 441 constant 2000 international dollars) would result in an increase of 1.32 units in
the corruption level for a country like Peru, which is roughly 0.58 standard deviations in the corrup-
tion scores in our sample.70 For a country like Denmark, on the other hand, one standard deviation
increase in FDI per capita would result in no change in corruption scores.
Model 4-6 reproduces the tests interacting FDI with democracy: instrumented FDI and its in-
teraction term with the Polity measure of democracy enter with expected signs and are statistically
signiﬁcant beyond conventional levels. Note that while the net marginal effect turns negative for
values of democracy above 15.5, the net estimated effect is not signiﬁcantly different from zero for
values of democracy that range between 10 and 18.5.
Figure 4 graphs the marginal effect of FDI inﬂows on corruption at different levels of economic
development (top graph) and democracy (bottom graph). The marginal effect and 95% conﬁdence
intervals are obtained from simulations using the coefﬁcients from Models 4-5 (top graph) and 4-6
68The marginal effect is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero for GDP per capita values above $8,385, the
value that corresponds to Costa Rica’s. The estimated net effect turns negative for values of GDP per capita above Japan’s
but it never attains statistical signiﬁcance in our sample, suggesting that there is no association between FDI and corruption
at the highest levels of development.
69Table G in the Appendix reproduces the list of countries included in the analyses, and their corresponding GDP per
capita, democracy, FDI inﬂows, and Corruption scores.
70The marginal effect is doubled for countries in the bottom quartile of the GDP/cap distribution.
30(bottom graph) in Table 4, holding other variables constant. The top graph in ﬁgure 4 shows that at
the lowest levels of development in the sample, FDI is associated with higher levels of corruption, and
the effect tapers off at higher levels of development. The bottom graph shows that FDI is associated
with higher levels of corruption in the least democratic countries and lower levels of corruption in
democratic countries.71
[Figure 4 about here]
3.4.7 Additional Robustness Checks
To further check the robustness of the ﬁndings, we employ alternative measures of democracy, in-
cluding Parcomp and Polcomp from the Polity IV project, Freedom House’s political rights index and
Vanhanen’s (2003) measures of political participation. We also use a factor score of GDP per capita
and democracy to capture a country’s joint level of economic and political development as economic
and political development tend to go hand-in-hand. The ﬁndings suggest that FDI is associated with
higher levels of corruption in countries with the lowest levels of economic and political development
in our sample. In addition, we replace Transparency International’s CPI with the corruption measures
constructed by the World Bank and International Country Risk Guide. The results are robust and
consistent across different model speciﬁcations. We also experiment with corruption measures con-
structedfromGlobalCorruptionBarometer(GCB)andtheWorldBankBusinessEnvironmentSurvey
(WBES). Finally, we utilize a factor score of FDI and trade openness as a measure of economic in-
tegration. The results indicate that economic integration has a weaker effect on corruption, which
suggests that the effect of integration on corruption is mainly through FDI inﬂows, not trade. The
detailed discussions and results from these alternative speciﬁcations are presented in the Appendix.
71In Figures A and B in the Appendix we draw the slopes of FDI on corruption for two different groups of countries
across legal origins. The slopes are based on the coefﬁcients from Models 4-5 and 4-6. The upward trending (solid) line
in each box reﬂects the effect of FDI inﬂows on corruption for the subset of less developed (Figure A) or less democratic
countries (Figure B). The downward sloping (dashed) line reﬂects the effect of FDI inﬂows on corruption for the subset
of developed (Figure A) or democratic countries (Figure B). We set the log of GDP per capita/democracy at the mean of
the sub-sample of countries below the threshold at which the effect of FDI on corruption is zero, and set the log of GDP
per capita/democracy at its mean for the subset of countries above the threshold. Figure A show that the slope for the
average developed country is smaller than the slope for the average developing countries in absolute terms; a similar trend
is found on the effect of FDI on corruption for the average democratic and non-democratic countries.
314 Conclusion
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has the potential to affect economic and political conditions in host
countries. Yet, the desirability of these effects is controversial: for every analysis describing FDI as
a vehicle for the diffusion of good governance, there is an account vilifying multinationals and their
alleged deleterious effects on host countries. In this paper we concentrate on the relationship between
inward foreign investment and corruption. We argue that whether FDI and multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) have positive or negative effects on corruption depend on the underlying economic and
political environments in the host country. This argument runs counter to received wisdom where
the effects of FDI are construed as either always positive (increasing corruption) or always negative
(reducing corruption). The structure of the economy and the availability of local resources affect the
opportunities for rent creation. Rent sharing is at the center of instances of grand corruption. FDI has
the potential to affect the opportunities for rent creation, and could highlight the costs of engaging in
corruption. Thus, we argue that FDI will be associated with higher corruption levels in economic en-
vironments where competition is restricted and FDI is more likely to crowd out domestic investment.
To assess this relationship empirically, we need to deal with endogeneity, a problem that has been
overlooked in the literature to date: while inward FDI has the potential to affect corruption levels in
the host countries, corruption is also likely to affect investment ﬂows. To correct for endogeneity we
introduce a new instrument for FDI inﬂows, remoteness, which is operationalized as the weighted
distance to the 20 wealthiest economies in the world. Instrumenting FDI in a two-stage least square
setting we test whether the the effect of FDI on corruption depends on the underlying conditions in
the host as predicted. Consistent and robust empirical evidence strongly supports these predictions:
In less economically developed economies increasing FDI inﬂows is positively associated with cor-
ruption, while in more diversiﬁed economies and competitive environments increasing FDI inﬂows
are associated with lower levels of corruption, although in the latter cases the marginal effect of FDI
on corruption is relatively small.72 We also ﬁnd that FDI is associated with higher levels of corruption
72One plausible explanation for this ﬁnding is that once corruption levels are low due to the existence of institutional
checks, the establishment and consolidation of the rule of law, and property rights protection associated with democratic or
political development, there is limited room for a substantial reduction of corruption resulting from increased competition
and efﬁciency brought about by foreign investment and the activity of MNCs.
32under authoritarian regimes, but could lead to lower levels of corruption in long lasting democracies.
Our argument is not new; it builds on earlier work on the political economy of corruption by
renowned scholars such as Gordon Tullock (1967), Anne Krueger (1974), Susan Rose-Acerkman
(1978), Jagdish Bhagwati (1982), Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1993), Alberto Ades and Rafael
Di Tella (1999), and Daniel Treisman (2000) among others. This literature has emphasized the role of
political and economic competition, or lack thereof, in the costs and beneﬁts analysis faced by public
ofﬁcials and economic agents when deciding whether to engage in predatory behavior, corruption and
bribery. Our main theoretical contribution is the emphasis placed on the effect of foreign investment
on the costs of and opportunities for engaging in corruption.
Conventionalwisdomstatesthatincreasinginwardinvestmentwillreducecorruptioninhostcoun-
tries because of the increasing competition and the diffusion of norms and values associated with FDI.
Our results suggest that this claim does not hold empirically. In countries with less diversiﬁed markets
and weaker political institutions, inward FDI could result in higher corruption levels. Our argument
has also found partial support in journalistic accounts and anecdotal evidence, mostly drawn from de-
veloping countries: multinational corporations do not necessarily demand higher standards of public
governance, nor are they less likely than their domestic counterparts to engage in corruption. Ours is,
we believe, the ﬁrst study to analyze these effects systematically drawing on data from both develop-
ing and developed countries.
Lastly, our ﬁndings underscore the importance of understanding the political and economic deter-
minants of foreign investment. Future research should explore the consequences of the endogenously
determined investment ﬂows. Political and economic conditions in the host country are likely to af-
fect not only the location decision of foreign investors, but also their choice of the form of entry.
Investors’ location and form of entry decisions, in turn, affect the political and economic conditions
in host countries. While some investors are attracted to countries with favorable business climates and
goodgovernanceinstitutions, othersaremotivatedbytheopportunitiesforrentcreationandextraction
in countries whose leaders are institutionally unconstrained and politically unchallenged. Investors
of the latter type have the potential to worsen political and economic conditions in the host country,
particularly in less developed and less democratic countries.
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39Figure 2: Observed and Constructed FDI, N=94
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Figure 3: Observed and Constructed FDI without Outliers, N=91
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40Figure 4: Marginal effect of FDI on Corruption
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41Figure 5: First Stage: Studentized Residuals, Hat Values, and Cook Distances
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42Figure 6: First Stage: Added-Variable Plots
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Notes: Added-variable plots (partial regression plots): Plots of residuals of regression FDI/cap
on all other regressors against residuals of regression of xi on all other regressors.
43Table 1: OLS Regression Results - DV: Corruption (CPI)
Models 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4
FDI/capita -0.041*** -0.039*** 0.170* -0.154**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.125) (0.066)
Ln(GDP/cap) -1.320*** -1.326*** -1.261*** -1.278***
(0.157) (0.158) (0.161) (0.158)
Democracy 0.007 0.010 0.003 -0.007
(Polity IV) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Interactions
(FDI/cap)  -0.129*
Ln(GDP/cap) (0.076)
(FDI/cap)  0.006*
Democracy (0.003)
Controls
Fuel exports 1.114** 1.154** 1.074** 1.136**
(0.490) (0.495) (0.492) (0.489)
Ln(Open) 0.093 0.072 -0.030 0.222
(0.257) (0.259) (0.263) (0.269)
Ethno-ling. 0.176 0.398 0.601 0.382
fractionaliz. (0.477) (0.517) (0.525) (0.510)
Religion
Catholic 0.473 0.536 0.420 0.455
(0.408) (0.490) (0.489) (0.486)
Muslim -0.498 -0.406 -0.382 -0.533
(0.502) (0.557) (0.551) (0.554)
Protestant -3.334*** -3.482*** -3.134*** -3.627***
(0.660) (0.682) 0.705 (0.678)
Legal Origin
British -0.460 -0.386 -0.364
(0.397) (0.395) (0.396)
French -0.362 -0.242 -0.289
(0.439) (0.440) (0.435)
Constant 5.486*** 5.755*** 5.947*** 5.435***
(1.216) (1.243) (1.235) (1.240)
N 94 94 94 94
R2 0.799 0.802 0.809 0.810
Adj. R2 0.777 0.776 0.781 0.781
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
44Table 2: First Stage Results - DV: FDI/capita
Models 2-1 2-2 2-3a 2-3b
Remoteness 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Ln(GDP/cap) 2.373** 2.021*
(1.111) (1.078)
Absolute Latitude 7.188 2.699***
(8.426) (0.754)
Democracy -0.087 -0.134 0.002 0.039**
(Polity IV) (0.209) (0.202) (0.209) (0.019)
Controls
Fuel Exports -0.046 -0.157 0.693 0.286
(3.549) (3.424) (3.684) (0.329)
Ln(Open) 5.376*** 5.211*** 6.514*** 0.459***
(1.752) (1.687) (1.838) (0.164)
Ethno-ling. 5.421 1.417 3.523 -0.872***
fractionaliz. (3.426) (3.555) (3.594) (0.321)
Religion
Catholic 3.449 2.512 3.851 0.141
(2.913) (3.367) (3.066) (0.274)
Muslim -1.741 -3.660 -3.520 -0.743**
(3.681) (3.956) (3.688) (0.330)
Protestant -4.532 -2.832 -4.796 -0.053
(4.828) (4.732) (5.132) (0.459)
Legal Origin
British 8.450***
(2.849)
French 5.947*
(3.111)
Constant -24.657*** -28.070*** -31.861*** -2.886***
(8.362) (8.132) (9.181) (0.821)
DV FDI FDI FDI GDP/cap
N 94 94 94 94
R2 0.517 0.565 0.641 0.648
Adj. R2 0.465 0.506 0.604 0.611
F-Statistics 28.04 37.58 19.08 11.47
of the (excluded) instruments
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
45Table 3: IV Regresion Results - DV: Corruption (CPI)
Models 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7
FDI/capita -0.039 -0.048** 0.082** 0.046 -0.062** 0.366* 0.005
(0.026) (0.024) (0.040) (0.041) (0.031) (0.206) (0.041)
Ln(GDP/cap) -1.325*** -1.289*** -1.321*** -1.267*** -1.560*** -1.468*** -1.267***
(0.184) (0.178) (0.187) (0.530) (0.241) (0.273) (0.183)
Concentration -1.406
(ECI) (1.067)
Democracy 0.008 0.010 0.047 0.036 0.010 -0.020
(Polity IV) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.040) (0.032) (0.044)
Democratic -0.830*
(1930-1995) (0.468)
Interactions
(FDI/cap)  -0.076*** -0.036***
Ln(GDP/cap) (0.019) (0.010)
(FDI/cap)  0.429*
Concentration (0.243)
(FDI/cap)  -0.018** -0.020
Democracy (0.009) (0.023)
Controls
Fuel exports 1.118** 1.129** 1.184** 1.144** 1.397** 1.064 0.912*
(0.494) (0.499) (0.504) (0.537) (0.614) (0.710) (0.494)
Ln(Open) 0.083 0.136 -0.275 0.056 0.140 -1.475 -0.243
(0.305) (0.296) (0.324) (0.331) (0.342) (0.893) (0.365)
Ethno-ling. 0.170 0.417 0.035 -0.674 0.418 0.067 0.236
fractionaliz. (0.485) (0.520) (0.496) (0.927) (0.550) (0.700) (0.491)
Religion
Catholic 0.467 0.583 0.275 0.307 0.836 0.336 0.422
(0.423) (0.502) (0.434) (0.475) (0.506) (0.612) (0.424)
Muslim -0.501 -0.384 -0.207 -0.785 -0.197 -0.662 -0.505
(0.504) (0.561) (0.520) (0.605) (0.579) (0.730) (0.498)
Protestant -3.334*** -3.474*** -3.156*** -2.907*** -2.880*** -2.860*** -2.562***
(0.660) (0.684) (0.674) (0.771) (0.765) (0.978) (0.742)
Legal Origin
British -0.431
(0.403)
French -0.350
(0.441)
Constant 5.525*** 5.494*** 6.350*** 5.411*** 5.015*** 12.382*** 6.998***
(1.372) (1.373) (1.414) (1.495) (1.528) (3.951) (1.540)
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R2 0.799 0.801 0.793 0.776 0.760 0.624 0.796
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
46Table 4: IV Regression Results - DV: Corruption (CPI)
Models 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6
FDI/capita 0.294* -0.149 0.623*** 0.076 0.265* 0.605**
(0.159) (0.094) (0.233) (0.117) (0.154) (0.241)
Ln(GDP/cap) -1.984*** -1.470*** -0.904*** -1.241*** -2.054*** -0.875***
(0.688) (0.301) (0.233) (0.248) (0.727) (-0.226)
Concentration -1.950*
(ECI) (1.071)
Democracy 0.032 -0.023 -0.016 0.043 -0.026
(Polity IV) (0.042) (0.033) (0.029) (0.044) (0.031)
Democratic -0.047
(1930-1995) (0.517)
Interactions
(FDI/cap)  -0.178*** -0.170***
Ln(GDP/cap) (0.037) (0.034)
(FDI/cap)  0.908**
Concentration (0.377)
(FDI/cap)  -0.039*** -0.212*** -0.039***
Democracy (0.011) (0.075) (0.011)
Controls
Fuel exports 1.086* 1.174** 0.979** 0.828* 1.108* 0.889*
(0.584) (0.580) (0.475) (0.480) (0.599) (0.493)
Ln(Open) 0.008 0.191 (0.064) (0.042) 0.027 (0.213)
(0.351) (0.325) (0.304) (0.321) (0.355) (0.334)
Ethno-ling. -0.629 0.320 0.144 0.220 -0.598 0.173
fractionaliz. (0.864) (0.511) (0.458) (0.475) (0.886) (0.518)
Religion
Catholic 0.201 0.877* 0.194 0.322 0.277 0.265
(0.478) (0.478) (0.394) (0.397) (0.587) (0.496)
Muslim -0.825 -0.266 -0.741 -0.350 -0.752 -0.652
(0.650) (0.541) (0.489) (0.483) (0.706) (0.563)
Protestant -2.599*** -2.405*** -2.717*** -1.861** -2.582*** -2.619***
(0.964) (0.870) (0.786) (0.824) (0.972) (0.802)
Legal Origin
British -0.441 -0.195
(0.506) (0.404)
French -0.358 -0.214
(0.539) (0.435)
Constant 5.412*** 5.573*** 6.930*** 6.043*** 5.491*** 7.892***
(1.488) (1.367) (1.341) (1.252) (1.540) (1.526)
N 91 91 91 91 91 91
R2 0.749 0.780 0.814 0.804 0.753 0.806
Adj. R2 0.717 0.749 0.790 0.780 0.715 0.777
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
47Appendix
Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Political Development
In order to deal with the problems of possible inappropriate aggregation and measurement error in Polity IV’s
measure of democracy (Treier and Jackman 2008; Vreeland 2008), we use two variables from the Polity IV
project that measure the degree of competitiveness of the political system, Parcomp and Polcomp, which are
arguably less susceptible to that critique.73 Using Parcomp (and Polcomp) yields even stronger results (see
Model A-1 and A-2 in Table A): the coefﬁcients of both instrumented FDI and the interaction terms with
Parcomp/Polcomp are statistically signiﬁcant and in the expected direction, while the coefﬁcient on Parcomp is
also statistically signiﬁcant beyond conventional levels in Model A-1.
[Table A about here]
In Models A-3 and A-4, we use Freedom House’s political rights index and Vanhanen’s (2003) measures of
political participation as alternative measures of political development.74 Note that in the Freedom House index
of political rights higher values reﬂect lower degrees of freedom, so we should expect a negative coefﬁcient on
FDI and a positive coefﬁcient on the interaction term between political freedom and FDI. Again, both FDI
and its interaction term have the predicted signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. Our ﬁndings are robust to
alternative speciﬁcations and modeling strategies, and seem to strongly support the hypotheses that the effect
of FDI on corruption depend on the underlying economic and political conditions in the host country.
Robustness Checks: Economic and Political Development
In earlier sections we have present two different mechanisms through which economic and political develop-
ment would affect the marginal effect of foreign investment on corruption and tested them separately. Yet,
economic development is found to be both a pre-condition for political development and a consequence of
good governance (Przeworski et al. 2000). Hence GDP per capita could be capturing better governance and
institutions. The reverse interpretation is also possible: that our measure of institutional development is cap-
turing the effect of economic development and diversiﬁed markets. Ideally we would introduce the interaction
terms between FDI and GDP per capita and democracy and a three-way interaction in the same equation. The
exercise is, however, not practical in the current setting for two main reasons: ﬁrstly, per capita GDP, democracy
and their interaction term are highly collinear. Secondly, given the small sample size, purging the three-way
interaction term is impossible using the techniques discussed before. Thus, we adopt an alternative strategy.
We conduct a principal factor analysis of GDP per capita and democracy and obtain a factor score as a mea-
sure of political-economic development.75 Then we use each country’s absolute latitude to instrument for this
measure of political-economic development variable. We use the instrumented measure of political-economic
development in an interaction with instrumented FDI. These results, reproduced in Model A-5, provide addi-
tional support to our hypotheses.76 The coefﬁcients on FDI and the measure of political-economic development
73Parcomp measures the extent that non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression. The
greater the extent of the franchise and the more that alternative preferences for policies and leadership can be pursued
in the political arena, the higher the Parcomp score. Parcomp ranges from 0 (unregulated) to 5 (fully competitive), with
5 indicating open competition for political leadership. Polcomp is a concept variable created by combining Parcomp
with Parreg, which codes the degree of regulation of political participation ranging from unregulated and ﬂuid to regu-
lated where no groups are excluded from participation. The concept variable Polcomp ranges from 1 (suppressed) to 10
(instutionalized electoral competition). See Marshall and Jaggers (2004).
74For political participation we use data for 2000 which is the latest year available.
75We do principal component analysis and obtain one component with eigenvalue greater than 1. This component
explains 78.18% of the two variables’ combined variance.
76We have run multiple regressions to test the robustness of our results. First, we simply interact the factor score with
instrumented FDI. Second, we instrument both FDI and the factor score. Finally, we test the outliers in the ﬁrst- and
second-stage regressions by calculating the Cook Distance. The results from these tests suggest that Belgium and Singa-
pore are outliers. We run additional regressions after dropping these outliers. Results from these additional speciﬁcations
48are -0.017 and -1.954 respectively, but fail to attain statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels; the coefﬁ-
cient on the interaction term is -0.074 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The three coefﬁcients are
jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The results show that in less developed countries FDI inﬂows are associated
with higher corruption levels. In countries with higher scores in the composite measure of political-economic
development FDI is associated with lower levels of corruption.
Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Corruption
We use two alternative measures of our dependent variable. These results are reproduced in Table B. In Models
B-1 and B-2, we use corruption scores from the International Country Risk Guide created by the PRS group
based on expert accounts and home country surveys.77 Models B-3 and B-4 use the measure of corruption
obtained from the World Bank.78 Again, we instrument FDI and interact it ﬁrst with instrumented GDP and
next with democracy. These results are, again, consistent with our earlier ﬁndings. Higher real GDP per
capita—and democracy—are associated with lower corruption scores. The coefﬁcients on instrumented FDI
per capita are positive. The coefﬁcients on the interaction terms (FDI and GDP in Models B-1 and B-3 and FDI
and democracy in Models B-2 and B-4) are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant beyond conventional levels.
[Table B about here]
One potential critique is that the measures of corruption used in our analyses are subjective. Ideally, we
should use objective measures of corruption. However, there is no objective measure of grand corruption that
could be used for cross-national analysis. The alternatives such as Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) and
the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) are measures based on individuals and businessmen,
usually described as indices of “experienced” corruption. These are as subjective as experts’ opinions and tend
to be better proxies for petty corruption rather than grand corruption.79 One of the main objections to these
measures is how truthful responses are in less democratic and/or repressive settings.80 There is also an issue
of reliability: different measures created by different institutions do not highly correlate with each other. The
measures of corruption used in our analyses, on the other hand, are highly correlated with each other, and thus
seem to tap on one dimension that is correlated with some behavioral outcomes (see Fisman and Miguel 2006).
These subjective measures are also correlated with the experience measures. Yet, these so-called experience-
based measures of corruption cover at most 80 countries (before dealing with data availability problems in
multivariate setting), which makes it impossible to run 2SLS regressions using the techniques discussed before.
Finally, the countries in GCB 2004 and 2005 tend to be wealthier and more democratic than those in our sample.
Using these two measures we are unable to achieve non-linear results, which should be no surprise given that
we are sampling on more developed and democratic countries. We do ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of FDI is positive
and signiﬁcant in a linear IV regression using the WBES data, which means that FDI inﬂows tend to increase
corruption.81
Robustness Checks: Economic Integration
Finally, we explore whether economic integration including FDI inﬂows and trade is the driving force behind
corruption. We conduct a principal factor analysis on FDI per capita and trade openness to obtain a factor
are statistically and substantively similar to those discussed in the text. They are available from the authors upon request.
77Corruption scores from International Risk Guide are ranked from 0-6. We re-scaled the score to a range of 0-10 and
took reverse of the scores so that higher scores represent higher levels of corruption. We average the corruption scores for
the 2000-2004 period.
78We take the reverse of the World Bank’s corruption scores in order to better interpret the results. After pairwise
deletion of missing values and dropping the three outliers, we have 100 observations.
79See Treisman (2007) for a discussion of different measures of corruption.
80See Jensen, Li and Rahman (2010) who analyze the patterns of non-responses or non-truthful responses in the World
Bank’s ﬁrm surveys.
81We drop Singapore and do not control for legal origins which signiﬁcantly reduce the sample size.
49score as a measure of economic integration, and then instrument integration using the weighted geographic
distance. Results are shown in Models B-5 and B-6 in Table B. In Model B-5, both coefﬁcients of integration
and the interaction term of integration and GDP per capita are not statistically signiﬁcant, though they have
expected regression signs. In Model B-6, the results indicate economic integration tends to increase corruption
in nondemocratic countries while decrease corruption in advanced democracies. Overall, the results are weaker
than those when FDI interacts with GDP per capita and democracy, which suggests that FDI inﬂows are likely
to be the underlying driving force.
50Figure A: Effect of FDI on Corruption by Level of Development
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Figure B: Effect of FDI on Corruption by Democracy Score
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51Table A: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Democracy
Models A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5
FDI/capita 0.998*** 0.708** -0.299*** 0.417** -0.017
(0.344) (0.289) (0.094) (0.195) (0.144)
Ln(GDP/cap) -0.710*** -0.852*** -1.106*** -1.001***
(0.261) (0.230) (0.244) (0.219)
Political-Economic -1.954
Development (1.219)
Democracy
Parcomp -0.454**
(0.192)
Polcomp -0.085
(0.065)
Political Rights -0.091
(0.119)
Participation 2000 -0.014
(0.011)
Interactions
(FDI/cap)  -0.227*** -0.088*** 0.223*** -0.010***
Democracy (0.065) (0.028) (0.067) (0.003)
(FDI/cap)  -0.074**
Pol-Econ. Development (0.031)
Controls
Fuel exports 0.077 0.656 0.773 0.566 0.273
(0.611) (0.510) (0.546) (0.496) (0.691)
Ln(Open) -0.799* -0.396 0.021 -0.274 0.447
(0.465) (0.381) (0.330) (0.342) (0.434)
Ethno-ling. 0.276 0.157 0.514 0.055 -0.109
fractionaliz. (0.588) (0.527) (0.572) (0.515) (0.959)
Religion
Catholic -0.085 0.131 0.163 0.135 0.981
(0.579) (0.512) (0.544) (0.496) (0.648)
Muslim -0.764 -0.697 -0.642 0.670 -1.607
(0.628) (0.575) (0.602) (0.541) (1.518)
Protestant -2.075** -2.439*** -2.153** -1.989** -2.063**
(0.922) (0.824) (0.878) (0.831) (1.029)
Legal Origin
British -0.026 -0.144 0.057 -0.483 0.186
(0.460) (0.413) (0.442) (0.407) (0.521)
French 0.108 -0.063 0.330 -0.287 0.128
(0.508) (0.454) (0.496) (0.425) (0.598)
Constant 11.434*** 8.869*** 5.739** 8.291*** 4.195**
(2.251) (1.732) (1.388) (1.560) (1.826)
N 91 91 91 91 92
R2 0.756 0.800 0.773 0.810 0.717
Adj. R2 0.718 0.768 0.738 0.781 0.679
Democracy Parcomp Polcomp Freedom House Vanhanen Polecon Dev.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
52Table B: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Corruption & Economic In-
tegration
Models B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 B-5 B-6
FDI/capita 0.264 0.757*** 0.052 0.201**
(0.191) (0.256) (0.050) (0.083)
Econ. Integration 0.155 4.841*
(Factor Score) (0.427) (2.444)
Ln(GDP/cap) -1.307 -0.153 -0.668*** -0.316*** -2.142*** -1.211***
(0.930) (0.275) (0.188) (0.087) (0.403) (0.322)
Democracy -0.026 -0.094* -0.002 -0.020 0.044 -0.203**
(Polity IV) (0.049) (0.036) (0.014) (0.012) (0.042) (0.101)
Interactions
(FDI/cap)  -0.143*** -0.066***
Ln(GDP/cap) (0.040) (0.013)
(FDI/cap)  -0.045*** -0.016***
Democracy (0.012) (0.004)
Integration -0.180
Ln(GDP/cap) (0.159)
Integration -0.282**
Democracy (0.119)
Controls
Fuel 1.565** 1.232** 0.627*** 0.568*** 1.161** 0.637
(0.690) (0.564) (0.221) (0.213) (0.572) (0.767)
Ln(Open) -0.259 -0.456 0.085 -0.015
(0.420) (0.357) (0.113) (0.120)
Ethno-ling. -0.042 0.77 -0.095 0.108 -0.744 0.215
fractionaliz. (1.120) (0.591) (0.258) (0.210) (0.811) (0.783)
Religion
Catholic -0.078 -0.190 0.220 0.196 0.461 0.706
(0.665) (0.577) (0.223) (0.220) (0.568) (0.760)
Muslim -0.944 -0.97 -0.254 -0.271 -0.732 -0.641
(0.807) (0.653) (0.244) (0.239) (0.663) (0.881)
Protestant -3.154*** -3.063*** -0.637* -0.719** -2.949 -2.651**
(1.097) (0.916) (0.339) (0.331) (0.898) (1.193)
Legal Origin
British -0.235 0.018 0.088 0.106 -0.473 -0.183
(0.555) (0.453) (0.170) (0.166) (0.461) (0.617)
French -0.556 -0.316 -0.009 -0.002 -0.516 -0.563
(0.625) (0.500) (0.192) (0.186) (0.516) (0.667)
Constant 7.264*** 9.458*** -0.383 0.518 6.043*** 10.013***
(1.754) (1.690) (0.538) (0.567) (0.694) (1.919)
N 91 91 100 100 91 91
R2 0.565 0.663 0.805 0.806 0.760 0.627
Adj. R2 0.498 0.612 0.778 0.780 0.726 0.576
Source for DV ICRG ICRG WB WB TI TI
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
53Table C: Cook’s Distance: First Stage
Country FDI/cap Residuals Cook’s distance
Japan 0.46 12.49 0.07
Ireland 41.62 13.59 0.09
Great Britain 10.43 -14.97 0.10
France 8.09 -18.51 0.16
Singapore 32.73 19.86 0.23
Belgium 86.50 45.58 1.92
Obs. with Cook distances larger than the cutoff 4=(n   k   1)
Table D: Cook’s Distance: Second Stage
Model 3-3
Country CPI FDI/cap Residuals Cook’s Distance
New Zealand 0.52 9.431 -2.384 0.080
Papua New Guinea 7.65 0.444 2.227 0.083
Chile 2.56 5.685 -3.251 0.090
United Kingdom 1.40 10.425 -1.898 0.093
Singapore 0.74 32.731 -0.609 0.145
Gabon 6.70 0.587 1.697 0.183
Belgium 3.02 86.496 2.175 3.168
Model 3-5
Country CPI FDI/cap Residuals Cook’s Distance
France 3.26 8.086 -0.901 0.054
Japan 3.10 0.456 -2.143 0.055
Mauritius 5.56 1.473 2.223 0.056
Papua New Guinea 7.65 0.444 2.830 0.061
South Korea 5.70 1.710 2.116 0.063
Bangladesh 8.90 0.073 1.243 0.100
Gabon 6.70 0.587 1.588 0.121
United Kingdom 1.40 10.425 -2.023 0.129
Ireland 2.68 41.622 0.073 0.160
Belgium 3.02 86.496 -0.329 0.443
Singapore 0.74 32.731 -7.415 1.807
Obs. with Cook distances larger than the cutoff 4=(n   k   1)
54Table E: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corruption - CPI (TI) 94 5.61 2.32 0.20 8.90
Corruption (WB) 94 -0.15 1.08 -2.42 1.28
Corruption (ICRG) 94 5.35 1.95 0.00 9.58
Real FDI per capita 94 4.81 10.77 -0.23 86.50
Remoteness 94 201.01 184.15 51.47 980.56
Absolute Latitude 94 0.28 0.19 0.01 0.71
Ln Real GDP per capita 94 0.10 1.15 -1.98 1.90
Export Concentration Index 94 0.28 0.19 0.05 0.88
Democracy (Polity) 94 15.52 5.43 3 20
Democratic (1930-1995) 94 0.23 0.43 0 1
Parcomp (Polity) 94 3.79 1.15 0 5
Polcomp (Polity) 94 7.83 2.59 1 10
Political Rights (Freedom House) 94 2.86 1.85 1 7
Participation (Vanhanen) 94 37.60 16.22 0 70
Natural Resources 94 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.98
Ln Openness 94 4.22 0.50 3.04 6.00
Ethno-ling. Fractionalization 94 0.33 0.30 0 0.89
Catholic 94 0.36 0.38 0 0.97
Muslim 94 0.20 0.33 0 1.00
Protestant 94 0.13 0.21 0 0.98
British Legal Origin 94 0.33 0.47 0 1
French Legal Origin 94 0.50 0.50 0 1
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56Table G: List of Countries
GDP/cap FDI/cap Democracy Corruption
Country ($1,000) ($100) (Polity) (CPI)
Albania 4.1 1.6 16.2 7.5
Algeria 5.8 0.7 8.0 7.4
Argentina 10.5 2.4 18.0 7.0
Australia 27.1 9.6 20.0 1.4
Austria 27.5 6.7 20.0 2.1
Bangladesh 2.0 0.1 16.0 8.9
Belgium 25.1 86.5 20.0 3.0
Benin 1.3 0.2 16.0 6.8
Bolivia 3.0 1.4 18.6 7.7
Botswana 8.0 3.3 19.0 4.0
Brazil 7.1 2.5 18.0 6.1
Bulgaria 7.9 5.7 18.8 6.1
Burkina Faso 1.0 0.1 9.4 7.0
Cameroon 2.6 0.4 6.0 8.0
Canada 27.5 9.6 20.0 1.1
Chile 11.9 5.7 19.0 2.6
China 4.6 1.4 3.0 6.6
Colombia 6.1 1.7 17.0 6.4
Costa Rica 8.4 2.8 20.0 5.3
Cote d’Ivoire 2.1 0.3 14.0 7.6
Cyprus 21.6 17.4 20.0 4.3
Denmark 28.0 16.1 20.0 0.4
Dominican Republic 6.8 3.0 18.0 6.8
Ecuador 4.4 1.7 16.0 7.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.6 0.3 4.0 6.7
El Salvador 4.7 0.9 17.0 6.2
Ethiopia 0.7 0.4 11.0 7.1
Finland 23.5 11.0 20.0 0.2
France 25.6 8.1 19.0 3.3
Gabon 9.8 0.6 6.0 6.7
Gambia, The 0.9 1.7 5.0 7.4
Germany 25.3 8.1 20.0 2.4
Ghana 1.4 0.4 15.6 6.5
Greece 15.2 1.5 20.0 5.6
Guatemala 3.8 0.4 18.0 7.5
Honduras 2.3 1.1 17.0 7.5
Hungary 12.5 7.0 20.0 5.0
India 2.8 0.2 19.0 7.2
Indonesia 4.0 -0.2 16.4 8.1
Ireland 27.1 41.6 20.0 2.7
Israel 21.3 6.4 20.0 3.0
Italy 22.9 3.0 20.0 4.9
Jamaica 4.6 2.5 19.0 6.3
Japan 24.1 0.5 20.0 3.1
Jordan 3.9 1.9 8.0 5.2
Kenya 1.2 0.0 14.0 8.0
Korea, Rep. 17.0 1.7 18.0 5.7
Madagascar 0.8 0.1 17.0 7.5
Malawi 0.8 0.0 15.0 6.8
Malaysia 11.6 2.6 13.0 5.0
Mali 1.1 0.4 16.0 6.9
Continued...
57Table G (cont.): List of Countries
GDP/cap FDI/cap Democracy Corruption
Country ($1,000) ($100) (Polity) (CPI)
Mauritius 16.2 1.5 20.0 5.6
Mexico 8.0 2.9 18.0 6.4
Morocco 3.9 0.6 4.0 6.3
Mozambique 1.3 0.6 16.0 7.4
Nepal 1.4 0.0 8.8 7.2
Netherlands 26.4 23.6 20.0 1.1
New Zealand 21.6 9.4 20.0 0.5
Nicaragua 3.4 1.7 18.0 7.5
Niger 0.8 0.0 14.0 7.8
Nigeria 1.1 0.3 14.0 8.6
Norway 33.9 5.3 20.0 1.2
Pakistan 2.5 0.2 4.6 7.6
Panama 8.0 2.9 19.0 6.6
Papua New Guinea 4.4 0.4 20.0 7.7
Paraguay 4.9 0.4 17.4 8.3
Peru 4.2 1.2 18.2 6.1
Philippines 3.7 0.5 18.0 7.3
Poland 9.0 4.0 19.6 6.1
Portugal 17.4 7.3 20.0 3.6
Romania 5.8 2.8 18.2 7.2
Senegal 1.4 0.2 18.0 6.9
Singapore 28.1 32.7 8.0 0.7
South Africa 8.7 1.5 19.0 5.3
Spain 20.3 10.1 20.0 3.0
Sri Lanka 4.1 0.4 15.4 6.5
Sudan 1.1 0.9 3.6 7.8
Sweden 25.9 11.1 20.0 0.8
Switzerland 29.0 12.8 20.0 1.3
Syrian Arab Republic 2.0 0.3 3.0 6.6
Tanzania 0.9 0.3 12.0 7.5
Thailand 6.8 1.2 19.0 6.7
Trinidad & Tobago 15.4 9.0 20.0 5.3
Tunisia 7.4 1.9 6.4 5.0
Turkey 5.6 0.6 17.0 6.6
Uganda 1.1 0.4 6.0 7.8
United Kingdom 25.6 10.4 20.0 1.4
United States 34.8 5.2 20.0 2.4
Uruguay 9.7 1.7 20.0 4.5
Venezuela, RB 7.0 1.4 16.2 7.5
Vietnam 2.4 0.9 3.0 7.5
Yemen, Rep. 1.1 0.1 8.0 7.5
Zambia 0.9 0.3 14.2 7.3
Zimbabwe 2.9 0.0 3.6 7.4
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